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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines a series of reforms to the funding framework for the K-12 education 
system in Saskatchewan during the past fourteen years. It examines the reforms implemented by 
three successive New Democratic Party governments from 1997 to 2007, and the Saskatchewan 
Party government from 2007 to 2011. The reforms implemented by the NDP governments 
included property tax reassessment, a farmland property tax rebate program, the mandatory 
amalgamation of school divisions, and an education property tax credit program. 
The reforms implemented by the Saskatchewan Party government included the extension of the 
education property tax credit program, major education property tax reform, and the introduction 
of an interim funding policy. 
The central research question is as follows: why did these provincial governments 
implement these reforms? In answering that question this thesis adopts a rational choice 
approach that will focus on the elements of political rationality and policy rationales that led 
these governments to make particular policy decisions.  
The key political rationality was their objective to gain and maintain electoral support by 
responding to the preferred solutions of a broad based coalition of influential advocacy groups 
within the municipal, agricultural, business and education sectors to what they perceived as 
problems within the K-12 education funding system. The key policy rationale of these provincial 
governments was to find a reform option that achieved the preferred mix of policy objectives. 
These policy objectives included designing and implementing an education funding system that 
provided adequate and equitable funding for school divisions, achieving an equitable system of 
property taxation, reducing the tax-load on the property tax base, and finding an appropriate level 
of accountability and school board local autonomy. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Focus and Research Question 
This thesis examines a series of reforms to the funding framework for the K-12 education 
system implemented by successive provincial governments in Saskatchewan during the past 
fourteen years. Toward that end, it examines the reforms implemented by three successive New 
Democratic Party governments from 1997 to 2007, and the Saskatchewan Party government 
from 2007 to 2011. The reforms implemented by the NDP governments include: (a) property tax 
reassessment in 1997; (b) the farmland property tax rebate program in 2000 and 2001; (c) the 
mandatory amalgamation of school divisions from 2004 to 2006; and (d) the education property 
tax credit program in 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
The reforms implemented by the Saskatchewan Party government include: (a) the 
extension of the education property tax credit program in 2008; (b) the major education property 
tax reform package in 2009 that included the transfer of authority for setting property tax mill 
rates from the school board to the provincial government, tax relief through a reduction in 
education property tax mill rates, and increased provincial transfers for education budgets to 
make up for the revenue lost from lower mill rates; and (c) the interim funding policy in 2009, 
with a new funding formula planned for adoption in 2012. 
The central research question is as follows: why did these provincial governments 
implement these reforms? In answering that question this thesis adopts a rational choice 
approach that will focus on the elements of political rationality and policy rationales that led 
these governments to make particular policy decisions.  
The major findings of the thesis are that a combination of political rationality and policy 
rationales led the provincial governments to implement education property tax policy reforms. 
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The key political rationality was their objective to gain and maintain electoral support by 
responding to the preferred solutions of a broad based coalition of influential advocacy groups 
within the municipal, agricultural, business and education sectors to what they perceived as 
problems within the K-12 education financing system. The key policy rationale of these 
provincial governments was to find a reform option that achieved the optimal mix of policy 
objectives. These policy objectives included designing and implementing an education funding 
system that provided adequate and equitable funding for school divisions, achieving an equitable 
system of property taxation, reducing the tax-load on the property tax base, and finding an 
appropriate level of accountability and school board local autonomy. 
1.2 Theoretical Approach 
 In addressing the central research question, this thesis adopts the rational choice 
approach. The rational choice approach to political analysis is based on the principle that 
political actors should be treated as rational utility maximizers (Howlett, Ramesh & Perl, 2009). 
The process involved in the rational choice approach to decision making is broken down into six 
key steps by Jones & Olson (1996): 1) Decision makers are confronted with a problem; 2) The 
objectives guiding decision makers are clarified and ranked according to their importance; 3) 
The various options for dealing with the problem are identified; 4) Each option is examined in 
terms of its costs and benefits; 5) The options are compared with each other; and 6) Decision 
makers choose the option that maximizes the attainment of their objectives. In short, the 
fundamental premise of the rational choice approach is that decisions are made by authoritative 
political actors based on rational calculations of the advantages and disadvantages of various 
policy options for dealing with policy problems. Invariably, analysts concede that the decision 
makers are operating on the basis of bounded, rather than comprehensive, rationality (Jones, et 
al., 2006). In making such calculations, the policy objectives of the key political actors are of 
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paramount importance. The key political actors in this thesis include the provincial government 
and influential advocacy groups. 
Two approaches involved in making these rational policy decisions are examined in this 
thesis, namely political rationality and policy rationales. Political rationality refers to the 
considerations that various policy issues and options have for the electoral objectives of 
governments. More specifically, it refers to the objective of acquiring and maintaining electoral 
support (Howlett, Ramesh & Perl, 2009). Within a democratic system, governments seeking to 
achieve that objective have to be particularly attuned and responsive to the preferences of 
influential advocacy groups.  In dealing with reforms to the education funding system in 
Saskatchewan, the provincial government had to be responsive to the preferences of several 
highly institutionalized and influential advocacy groups within the municipal, agricultural, 
business, and education sectors. The key advocacy groups within the municipal sector were the 
Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA), the Saskatchewan Association of 
Rural Municipalities (SARM), and the Provincial Association of Resort Communities of 
Saskatchewan (PARCS). The key advocacy groups within the agricultural sector included the 
Agricultural Producers Association of Saskatchewan, the Tax Action Group, and SARM which 
had a powerful agricultural as well as municipal lobby. The key business advocacy groups were 
the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, the chambers of commerce in Saskatoon and Regina, 
the Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association, and the Association of Saskatchewan 
Realtors. The key advocacy groups in the education sector included the Saskatchewan School 
Boards Association (SSBA) and the Saskatchewan Teachers Federation (STF). 
Policy rationales are used by the provincial governments to legitimate their policy 
reforms to stakeholders. The term „policy rationale‟ refers to the logic, rhetorical devices, data, 
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or arguments that are employed by a decision maker in order to justify a policy decision (Ingram 
& Schneider, 2011). The policy rationales considered in this thesis include the implicit or explicit 
positions of the key provincial political actors related to the policy objectives of reform. Policy 
rationale is therefore rooted in one or more policy objectives. The term policy objective is the 
catch-all term used in this thesis in place of similar policy rationale terms like principles, 
arguments, outcomes, values, or goals. A substantial portion of the discourse on reforming the 
funding system for K-12 education was rooted in multiple policy objectives. The most notable of 
these policy objectives were the following: local autonomy, tax equity, funding equity, tax relief, 
accountability, balanced education funding, and adequate education funding. Local autonomy in 
education funding describes the ability of school boards to respond to local priorities, which 
invariably requires financial flexibility in the spending but also in the raising of revenues 
(Lawton, 1987; Levin, 2005). Tax equity refers to the objective of achieving fairness in the level 
of taxation for various categories of ratepayers within and across communities. Property classes 
are an important category in this regard and include the major property classes of commercial, 
residential, and agricultural amongst other property classes. Funding equity refers to the 
objective of achieving fairness in the level of funds available for education purposes in various 
communities across the province. Tax relief refers to the objective of reducing the overall 
property tax load for ratepayers. Accountability refers to the objective of achieving transparency, 
answerability, and responsibility for financial management within the education system (O‟Brien 
& Stapenhurst, 2007; Auld & Kitchen, 2006). Balanced funding refers to the objective of 
achieving an appropriate ratio in the level of funding from provincial and local sources measured 
by the standard of key stakeholders. Adequate funding refers to the objective of ensuring that 
there is predictable and stable funding for all school divisions over time in order to ensure that 
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unforeseen financing crises or problems are avoided (Auld & Kitchen, 2006). Funding adequacy 
could possibly be connected to the policy objective of quality of education. A delimitation of this 
thesis will be to avoid the voluminous discourse and ambiguity surrounding the term quality of 
education by avoiding its use in the discussion of the policy objectives of education property tax 
reform. 
1.3 Elements of Saskatchewan’s Education Property Tax System 
 A full understanding and appreciation of the reforms to Saskatchewan‟s education 
property tax system requires an understanding of the basic elements of the property tax system as 
well as the Foundation Operating Grant (FOG) system for education. The property tax system in 
Saskatchewan has two key components. The Education Property Tax (EPT) component 
generates revenues for school boards. The other component of the local property tax system 
generates revenues for municipalities. Before major reforms to the EPT system occurred in 2009, 
school boards and municipal governments set the mill rates for their respective portion of taxes 
on property in Saskatchewan. Although each of them set their own mill rates, municipalities 
collected the education portion of property tax on behalf of school divisions and then transferred 
that portion to those school boards (Ministry of Education, March 18, 2009). The property tax 
system consists of four key components: 
1. Property assessment: This is the responsibility of the Saskatchewan Assessment 
Management Agency (SAMA), whose mandate is to oversee the property assessment 
system in the province and conduct assessments for all municipalities except the largest 
cities.  
2. The percentage of value (POV): This is the proportion of agricultural, commercial, 
residential, and other property class values that are available for municipal and education 
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property taxation. The POV is adjusted by the provincial government at the time of 
reassessment. 
3. The mill rate: The level of taxation applied to the POV-adjusted assessment. The mill rate 
is set at a level that fulfills the budgetary requirements of municipal governments and 
school boards. Before 2009, school boards determined the mill rate for their respective 
divisions. 
4. The mill rate factor: This refers to the adjustment that can be made to the property tax 
levy, allowing municipalities, and formerly school boards, to shift the burden of taxation 
between property classes without changing the overall level of tax revenue (SAMA, 
2008). 
The Foundation Operating Grant (FOG) system incorporated the EPT portion of 
education revenues into a wider education funding allocation system. Provincial funding was 
distributed to school divisions based on enrolments and local capacity which was measured by 
using the school division‟s assessment base (Government of Saskatchewan, April 11, 1997). The 
FOG was established in 1971 as a means of distributing funds from the provincial general 
revenue fund to school boards for operational purposes using a formula that takes into account 
the level of revenues generated from the local property tax base and the level of expenditures 
needed by each school division (Auld & Kitchen, 2006). The system was designed to provide a 
measure of local fiscal autonomy for school boards while providing an equalized level of funding 
for every school division in the province (Lawton, 1987). Since the reforms of 2009, the 
provincial government and school boards have been engaged in negotiations to produce a new 
funding formula to replace the defunct FOG system. Like the FOG, the new system will be used 
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by the provincial government to calculate the level of operating grants that will be transferred to 
school boards.  
1.4 Value of Thesis 
This thesis provides a valuable contribution to the academic literature and policy debate 
on education property tax reform for three interrelated reasons. First, it constitutes the first 
detailed systematic analysis of the recent reforms to Saskatchewan‟s EPT system. Second, it is 
valuable to understand the rationales and implications of reforms to such an important field of 
public policy. Education is the second largest expenditure area for the province of Saskatchewan 
at an estimated $1.43 billion in 2011 (Global [online], March 23, 2011). Education is also very 
important for social and economic development. It is for this reason that Section 156(1) of the 
Education Act, 1995 makes school attendance mandatory for all children aged seven to sixteen. 
The legislation on compulsory attendance reflects the perceived value of education in developing 
socialized, trained and productive citizens. The prevailing view is that the social benefits of 
education exceed the private benefits received by the individual who obtains an education (Auld 
& Kitchen, 2006). Education develops the human capacity to contribute to economic growth, 
standards of living, and quality of life. Education is also important for producing the type of 
educated and informed society that is essential for sustaining democracy.  
This thesis is also valuable because it sheds light on the past and current controversies 
regarding the source and level of funding for the K-12 education system. Education funding 
issues remain on the policy agenda in 2011 because some elements of the reforms have not been 
fully implemented. The outcomes of reforms are still subject to uncertainties and problems 
because the system is in a transitional phase. Media coverage remains high as school boards and 
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the provincial government clash over annual school budgets, and attempt to reconcile their 
differences to produce a new funding formula.  
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
 The remainder of the thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter two places 
Saskatchewan‟s EPT reforms in the comparative context of reforms in other Canadian provinces 
during the past two decades.  
 Chapters three, four and five analyze the key reform initiatives contemplated or 
undertaken by NDP governments between 1997 and 2007. Chapter three examines the property 
tax reassessment of 1997 based on updated market values. Chapter four examines the 
appointment of a commission in 2003 mandated to review and make recommendations on 
funding for the K-12 education system. Chapter five examines the school division amalgamation 
initiative, the EPT credit program, and the strategy involved in funding the tax credit program.   
Chapters six, seven, and eight examine the reform initiatives contemplated or undertaken 
by the Saskatchewan Party government. Chapter six examines the Saskatchewan Party‟s EPT 
policy that was articulated in its policy platform for the 2007 election, and how it differed from 
the NDP policy platform for that election. Chapter seven examines the mandate and 
recommendations of a task force appointed by the Saskatchewan Party government in 2008. The 
task force undertook consultations with key stakeholders and produced an issues and options 
paper related to EPT relief and funding for the K-12 education system. Chapter eight examines 
the important reform implemented by the Saskatchewan Party in conjunction with the 2009 
provincial budget. This reform transferred authority for setting education property tax mill rates 
from the school boards to the provincial government, provided major property tax relief for 
ratepayers, and increased provincial transfers for education funding. Chapter eight also provides 
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a brief analysis of several impacts of this reform on each of the following: the relationship 
between the provincial government and school boards; the separate school system; the municipal 
governments; and the property tax ratepayers.   
Chapter nine provides a summary and analysis of the major findings. The findings focus 
on the key determinants and implications of reforms. Political rationality and policy rationales 
are central to explaining the determinants and implications of EPT reforms. Some suggestions 
for further research are made based on the implications of the reforms. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
EDUCATION PROPERTY TAX REFORMS IN SELECTED CANADIAN PROVINCES 
 Pursuant to section 93 of the Constitution Act (1867) provincial governments have 
exclusive jurisdiction for K-12 education. This has empowered them to form and reform the 
governance and funding frameworks for their respective education systems. In recent decades, 
many provinces have reformed an important source of funding education, namely the Education 
Property Tax (EPT) system. One common feature of those reforms has been the transfer of the 
authority to set the mill rate from local education authorities to provincial governments. This 
chapter explores the emergence of this trend and the exception to it, namely Manitoba and its 
distinction as the only province that continues to authorize school boards to set property tax 
levies that generate a substantial amount of their revenues despite some reforms to the EPT 
system. Although this chapter devotes some attention to reforms of EPT policies during the past 
two decades, special attention is devoted to reforms adopted by Alberta and Manitoba. A detailed 
account of reforms in these two provinces is justified by the fact that they were the provincial 
policy option comparisons highlighted in the Government of Saskatchewan report that was 
produced to “explore the benefits and weaknesses of K-12 education funding options” (Reiter, 
2009, p. 2). 
2.1 Education Property Tax Policies in Canada: An Overview 
 A mix of EPT policy options existed in Canada when the newly elected Saskatchewan 
Party government was developing its agenda for major EPT reform in 2008 due to the reforms 
that had been completed in Canadian provinces (Reiter, 2009). The provincial funding models 
that existed at that time were based on various combinations of three types of revenue sources: 
general provincial revenue funding, a provincially-controlled EPT, or an EPT levied by school 
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boards (Auld & Kitchen, 2006). Full funding from the provincial general revenue fund existed in 
some provinces, but full funding from the EPT did not exist in any province. 
 In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, school boards had some unfettered access to the property 
tax base. The primary difference was that in Manitoba both the provincial government and 
school boards accessed the property tax base to fund education. The Education Support Levy 
was the portion of the EPT controlled by the provincial government, and the Special Levy was 
the portion of EPT controlled by school boards (Henley & Young, 2008). In Saskatchewan, 
school boards had exclusive authority to impose EPT levies until 2009; when the reform enacted 
that year by the Saskatchewan Party gave the provincial government control over those levies. 
The ratio of funding derived from provincial general revenue transfers and local property taxes 
differed between these two provinces. In 2008, the ratio in Manitoba was 65/35 between funding 
from the provincial sources, which included general revenue transfers and the provincial 
Education Support Levy, relative to funding through the local Special Levy. In Saskatchewan, 
the ratio was approximately 50/50 provincial transfers to local property tax that year (Reiter, 
2009).  It was not until the EPT reform of 2009 that the 63/37 ratio of provincial general revenue 
funding and provincially-controlled local property tax funding was achieved in Saskatchewan. 
Many provinces had policies that granted their provincial government full authority over 
education funding. For example, the EPT did not exist in Newfoundland and New Brunswick, as 
those provinces provided 100% of funding from provincial coffers (Newfoundland Labrador 
Department of Education, 2010; New Brunswick Department of Education, 2010). To reiterate, 
funding solely from EPT was not practiced in any Canadian province. 
The most common system of funding in Canadian provinces in 2008 was a combination 
of provincial general revenues and EPT. The combination included either full provincial control 
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over EPT, or some provincially restricted EPT levied by school boards (Auld & Kitchen, 2006). 
Provincial governments in Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island had control over the 
EPT. In Alberta and British Columbia, school boards could levy a small local property tax if 
approved by a plebiscite. These measures have never been used in Alberta, and have not been 
used since 1997 in British Columbia (Dawson, 2008). In Quebec, school boards have gained a 
small portion of their revenues from the local property tax base, subject to a provincially 
mandated cap. In all of these provinces, the remaining funding came from the general revenues 
of the provincial government.  
In the 1990s, Alberta and Ontario moved from a system in which the EPT was levied by 
the school boards, to one in which it was levied by the provincial government. The Alberta and 
Ontario reforms to the EPT system were implemented in 1994 and 1998 respectively, and have 
been the most significant and publicized reforms of the past two decades. Alberta‟s reforms are 
examined in more detail below because of their influence on all subsequent reforms including the 
ones in Saskatchewan that are the focus of this thesis. 
 
Table 2-1 Education Property Tax in Canadian Provinces (2008) 
Education Property Tax Provincial Government General Revenue 
100% <100% 
Non-existent NL, NB - 
Set by the province - *MB, ON, PE, NS 
Set by the province w/ 
discretionary levy available 
for school boards 
_ AB, BC 
Set by the school board 
subject to a provincial cap 
- QC 
Set by the school board - *MB, SK 
*Manitoba appears in two cells because both the provincial government and school boards set an 
EPT. 
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2.2 Education Property Tax Reform in Alberta 
 Ralph Klein‟s conservative party government prioritized education reform as a 
component of its deficit reduction platform in Alberta‟s 1993 provincial election. The type of 
EPT reform adopted by Alberta in 1994 was adopted in Ontario in 1998 and Saskatchewan in 
2009 (Langlois, March 27, 2009; Dawson, 2008). The Alberta Government proceeded with its 
reform package on January 17, 1994. The reforms included a spending reduction for education of 
12.4% over four years, amalgamation of school districts, and shifting control over local property 
tax from school boards to the provincial government. By removing property taxing authority and 
moving towards a provincially-controlled uniform mill rate, the government sought to block 
school boards from increasing EPT mill rates (Evans, 1999). The main policy rationale for 
reform was to reduce government spending, but interested advocacy groups who had long sought 
education reforms were compelled to get involved in reforming other aspects of the education 
system (Levin, 2001).  
Governmental and non-governmental stakeholders played a key role in adoption and 
evaluation of the Alberta reforms. The business community was at the forefront of advocacy 
groups pushing for change, as it sought to have the education system run more like a business. 
The Government of Alberta developed reform solutions in concert with such organizations as the 
Alberta Chamber of Resources, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Conference Board of 
Canada (Taylor, 2001). The vision for the new education system was laid out in a government 
„business plan‟ and school boards were also asked to produce annual „business plans‟. This new 
vision of K-12 education was steeped in business principles, and aimed at developing innovative 
and highly trained young people (Kachur, 1999). Two main groups opposed the reforms. The 
Alberta Teachers‟ Association (ATA) mobilized, and engaged in verbal jousts with the Klein 
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government. In particular, the ATA launched a $500,000 public awareness campaign against cuts 
to education (Levin, 2001; Taylor 2001). School boards were also vocal in their opposition to the 
provincial government‟s reform agenda. The ATA and Public School Boards Association of 
Alberta (PSBAA) were united in their criticism of education reform, but they differed on which 
reform had to be resisted and opposed most strongly (Taylor, 2001). The ATA focussed its 
attacks on the issue of declining funding levels, while the school boards fought the usurpation of 
local education property taxing authority. 
A policy rationale based on the policy objective of education funding equity was 
articulated by the provincial government. The provincial government publicized its position of 
promoting an equitable system in a story in the Edmonton Journal, explaining that: “Central 
control of all education taxes will ensure more equity in the system. Some school districts in the 
province have more than $20,000 to spend on each student. Others spend less than $5000 per 
pupil” (McConnell, January 21, 1994, p. A1). The equity objective was based on the perception 
that a disparity in taxable property, and by extension a disparity in financial resources, existed 
between school districts. 
Protection of the local autonomy policy objective, which was sought by the PSBAA, 
diverged from the government‟s equity objective. The Alberta public school boards argued that 
their local autonomy was integral to the democratic system in Canada and that this autonomy 
was being dismantled (PSBAA, 2011). The PSBAA launched legal action in order to defend 
their jurisdiction. The organization argued that access to a significant source of taxation was one 
of four necessary preconditions for local autonomy of school boards (PSBAA, 2011). The public 
school board‟s legal strategy was to achieve an equal level of protection to that held by separate 
school boards under section 93 of the Constitution Act of (1867), which constitutionally 
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entrenched the right of separate school boards to set a mill rate. Their basic argument was that 
depriving them of their autonomy was in effect a form of reverse discrimination. 
The Public School Boards Assn. Of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General) case worked its 
way through three different court systems, culminating in a Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
2000. Eleven Saskatchewan school divisions, the Saskatchewan School Trustees Association, 
and the Attorney General for Saskatchewan all achieved intervener status in the case (SCC, 
2000). The Saskatchewan presence in the proceedings signalled that stakeholders in 
Saskatchewan‟s education sector believed that this case could have repercussions for their 
province as well. The appeal by the PSBAA was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The key 
sentence in the ruling is simple and clear: “School boards do not enjoy reasonable autonomy 
from provincial control” (SCC, 2000, p. 5). The notable outcome of the PSBAA legal action was 
its failure to provide school boards with a constitutional basis on which to assert local autonomy 
in setting the EPT or in any other aspect of revenue generation. Thus, school boards in 
Saskatchewan that sought to defend their control over EPT had to do it through public policy 
channels rather than the legal channel of constitutional rights. 
2.3 Education Property Tax Reform in Manitoba 
The Manitoba Progressive Conservative (PC) government implemented some minor 
education reforms between 1994 and 1996. In 1995, the government released the action plan, 
Renewing Education: New Directions – The Action Plan (Manitoba Education and Training, 
January, 1995). The PC party formed a majority government in the 1995 provincial election and 
then proceeded with the reforms in 1996. Several pieces of legislation were passed by that 
government that had important effects for the education sector, including increasing the power of 
the minister of education, limits on teachers‟ rights in collective bargaining, and requiring school 
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boards to develop annual plans. Like Alberta‟s conservative government, Manitoba‟s PC 
government was also committed to reducing education funding in an effort to cut public 
spending (Levin, 2001). However, unlike its counterpart in Alberta, it stopped short of usurping 
the authority of school boards to set property tax levels. 
In 1999 the New Democratic Party (NDP) replaced the PC party as the government in 
Manitoba. Its principal education reform objective following the election was changing the EPT 
system to stem rising property taxes. Increased provincial transfers and increased property tax 
credits were implemented for that purpose, yet local property taxes continued to rise (Henley & 
Young, 2008). Some groups advocated for full provincial control of education funding, as they 
argued that the most recent reforms failed to stop or slow the steady rise in property taxes. 
Notable and influential critics who were seeking full provincial control of education funding 
included the following: the Manitoba Teachers Society, the Canada Taxpayers Association, the 
Winnipeg City Council, the Manitoba Real Estate Association, the Association of Manitoba 
Municipalities, and the Winnipeg Free Press. This informal coalition of interests argued that 
property taxes were too high and that the current system was inequitable, inefficient, and 
inadequately accountable (Henley & Young, 2008). The equity argument was based on two key 
objectives: the first was for equity in the funding of school divisions, and the second was for 
more equitable distribution of the property taxing burden across the province. School trustees, 
administrators, and superintendents countered that full provincial funding would not achieve a 
proper balance of policy objectives. These education system officials developed a joint position 
that equity policy objectives were important, but that at least a portion of education funding had 
to be derived from the local property tax in order to protect other policy objectives like local 
autonomy, local accountability, and responsiveness (Henley & Young, 2008).  
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Manitoba‟s NDP government resisted pressure to completely remove taxing authority 
from school boards by introducing a number of targeted reforms. The government used tax 
credits to ratepayers, funding increases, and a tax incentive grant that could be accessed by 
school boards who did not raise mill rates. These measures aimed to provide tax relief for 
ratepayers and reduced reliance on EPT by school boards. The residential portion was removed 
from the Education Support Levy, which helped cut the property tax burden in half by 2006 
(Henley & Young, 2008). The province‟s education property tax credit was hiked from $75 in 
1999, to $400 in 2007, and finally to $700 in 2011 (Henley & Young, 2008; Levin, 2005; 
Manitoba Finance 2011). In 2008, the government introduced a tax incentive grant that could be 
accessed by any school boards who did not increase their local property taxes year-over-year 
(Henley & Young, 2008). The success of these reforms in producing a better education funding 
system is a matter of perspective. What is clear is that they enabled continued protection of some 
degree of autonomy for school boards. The NDP government in Manitoba adopted a different 
approach to EPT reform than the one embraced by Alberta in 1994, by Ontario in 1998, and by 
Saskatchewan in 2009. 
2.4 Summary 
 This chapter has shown that during the past two decades policy convergence has occurred 
in most provinces in the funding systems for K-12 education. The trend has been a shift in mill 
rate setting authority for the EPT from local school boards to provincial governments. Two types 
of EPT systems now prevail including complete general revenue funding of education with no 
EPT, or a combination of provincial transfers with provincial control of EPT. The notable 
exception has been Manitoba where school boards gain about a third of their revenues through a 
local EPT. The Manitoba government used a variety of policies to decrease the EPT burden on 
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ratepayers while respecting the taxing authority of school boards. By contrast, Alberta‟s 
Progressive Conservative government led by Ralph Klein, which was aligned closely with 
business interests, removed the authority of school boards to levy property taxes. This particular 
reform to Alberta‟s EPT system was challenged unsuccessfully in the courts by the PSBAA. In 
the absence of legal protection for the authority of the school boards to set the EPT, Alberta‟s 
EPT reform model was adopted by Saskatchewan in 2009. The remainder of this thesis will 
focus on EPT reforms in Saskatchewan and the factors that influenced them.    
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE 1997 PROPERTY TAX REASSESSMENT IN SASKATCHEWAN 
Education property tax reform has been on Saskatchewan‟s political agenda for decades. 
The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) began criticizing the education 
property tax in the 1960s. In its efforts to gain traction on its bid for EPT reform it coined the 
slogan „education should be a tax on people, not property‟ (D. Harvey interview, 2011). Final 
reports from the Saskatchewan Local Government Finance Commission of 1986 and the School 
Finance and Governance Review of 1991 both recommended increasing provincial funding of 
education from 50% to 60% for the purpose of reducing inequities created by differences in 
taxation capacity and reducing the local discretion in setting mill rates for education property tax 
(SLGFC, 1986; Langlois & Scharf, 1991). Scrutiny of the tax was heightened when 
Saskatchewan properties were reassessed in 1997 for the first time since 1965. Total taxable 
assessment for Saskatchewan property jumped 363.97% after the 1997 reassessment (SAMA, 
1999). Controversy emerged because the reassessment produced shifts in the burden of taxation 
from one property to another, as well as shifting tax burden from one property class to another. 
The property classes of primary concern in this thesis are the residential, commercial, and 
agricultural classes. Further categories and divisions of categories include agricultural pasture 
land, arable agricultural land, residential property, multi-unit residential, seasonal residential, 
commercial, industrial, grain elevators, and railway right of ways and pipelines. In numerous 
individual cases assessment values increased disproportionately. Two other shifts occurred. 
Agricultural properties began bearing a larger burden of rural EPT bills after reassessment 
because of a collapse of property values in small towns due to rural depopulation. Also, the value 
of residential properties in cities was growing twice as fast as the value of commercial properties 
(Lyons, August 26, 1996; Government of Saskatchewan, February 28, 1997) The large rise in 
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overall taxable assessment did not produce a proportionate overall increase in property taxes 
because tax tools were provided by the provincial government to school boards and 
municipalities to manage the assessment increases. Nevertheless, the reassessment produced 
conspicuous shifts in tax burden for some properties and shifts in the burden between the 
residential, agricultural, and commercial property classes. 
This chapter examines the reassessment policies established by the provincial 
government at the start of the reassessment process, the advocacy group positions on these 
reassessment policies, and the policy prescriptions that the provincial government enacted in 
response to the positions of advocacy groups. The chapter reveals that the 1997 reassessment 
was a key provincial government initiative that contributed to increased calls for reforms to the 
EPT system in Saskatchewan and elevated the position of this reform issue on the policy agenda. 
3.1 Key Features of the Reassessment 
 The Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency (SAMA) is the independent 
government agency that was created in 1987 to enhance local government input and control in 
the administration of the property taxation system in Saskatchewan (SAMA, 1999; Hanselmann 
2000). SAMA set the rules for executing and administering the reassessment. The SAMA board 
of directors included representatives from rural and urban municipalities, school boards, the 
provincial government, and the professional appraisers who were employed to conduct 
assessment work. The purpose of the organization was to consult widely on reassessment and 
represent the interests of participating organizations and their constituents (SAMA, 1999). Pat 
Atkinson, the Minister of Education at the time, explained during implementation of the 
reassessment that 85% of elected municipal and school board officials voted at the SAMA 
annual meeting in 1995 in favour of reassessment being scheduled for the year 1997 (Atkinson, 
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April 3, 1997).  Reassessment was therefore not thrust upon unwilling municipalities and school 
boards by provincial authority, but instead had received their expressed consent. 
Assessment of property began on August 7, 1996. Outdated property assessments were 
updated to their current market value, resulting in larger assessments in many cases. The process 
sparked vigorous debate by stakeholders until it was completed. Municipalities were legally 
required to deliver assessment notices no later than January 1, 1997. The Government of 
Saskatchewan released its property tax policy regulations on October 15, 1996, establishing the 
rules for implementation. Two sets of policies were included in these regulations (Government of 
Saskatchewan, October 15, 1996). The first policy was the tax tools that would allow municipal 
governments to manage the tax shifts. Three tax tools were used. First was a mill rate factor, 
which allowed municipalities to shift the burden of taxation between property classes. Second 
was a tax phase-in, which permitted municipalities to gradually implement new assessment 
values over the course of three years. The third tool was a minimum tax, which authorized a 
municipality to set a minimum level of taxation for any property class. The tax tools shifted 
some accountability over the impact of reassessment on ratepayers from the provincial 
government to the municipalities. 
The second set of policies introduced on October 15, 1996 was the provincial percentage 
of value (POV) regulations for the eight property classes (Government of Saskatchewan, October 
15, 1996). The POV precedes the assessment stage of property taxation. As the Minister of 
Municipal Government explained in a press release at the time, POVs and property classes 
“cushion the tax shifts” by determining what percentage of the assessed value of a property will 
be taxable by school boards and municipalities (Lyons, August 26, 1996, p. A7). The POVs were 
as follows: Agricultural pasture land was set at 50%; arable agricultural land at 70%; residential 
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property at 75%; multi-unit residential at 85%; seasonal residential at 70%; commercial and 
industrial properties were set at 100%; grain elevators at 60%; and railway rights of way and 
pipelines at 70%. Like the mill rate factor, the POVs are weighted to reflect a government‟s 
political objective of who pays what. Determining who pays what requires the exercise of 
political judgement on the matter of taxation equity. The flexibility and responsibility to decide 
what is a fair percentage of taxable assessment, or a fair tax levy on one type of property relative 
to another type of property, is a deliberate political decision. The policies and outcomes of the 
1997 reassessment were complex, vulnerable to political action at the local and provincial levels, 
and tied into the wider structure of municipal and education funding (Garcea & Gilchrist, 2009). 
For these reasons, numerous advocacy groups produced public positions on the reassessment 
with the aim of influencing provincial policy responses. 
3.2 Advocacy Group Reactions to Property Reassessment 
A number of groups had an important stake in the reassessment process. Three of the 
stakeholders that articulated public positions on the reassessment were organizations that 
represented different property classes. Resort owners, the business lobby, and agricultural 
producers were concerned about the seasonal residential, commercial, and agricultural property 
classes respectively. School boards and municipal governments were also involved, but they 
were set apart by their status as local governing bodies mandated with setting a mill rate that 
applied to the property classes. 
The most vocal group during the reassessment was the farmers who had a strong interest 
in what would happen to the agricultural property classes. SARM defended the interests of rural 
municipalities and their agricultural constituents. The organization was aware of the 
demographic trends that were punishing rural property tax ratepayers. A decline in the 
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importance of grain elevators and the related trend of depopulation of towns and villages shifted 
the tax burden to farmers who formed the remaining component of the tax base of rural school 
divisions (G. Klein interview, 2011; K. Pontikes interview, 2011). A large hike in farmland 
assessment was anticipated, as these properties had long been undervalued, which contributed to 
a large rise in assessment value in rural areas. Assessment in rural municipalities jumped 
483.33%. This was a much higher increase than any other property class, including the 311.30% 
rise in cities; a jump of 252.89% in resorts, towns, and villages; the increase of 298.18% in urban 
municipalities; and the increase of 325.99% in northern municipalities (SAMA, 1999). The 
provincial percentages of value for the agricultural classes sought to soften this blow by setting 
agricultural POVs at 50% and 70%, compared to the higher POV of 75% on urban residential 
property and 85% on multi-unit residential property.  Nonetheless, the sense among farmers was 
that their property taxes were about to become much higher. A resolution at the SARM 
convention of 1997, called on all municipalities to refuse to implement the 1997 reassessment 
because it was argued that the tax tools provided by the province did not remedy the shift in 
education taxes (Lyons, March 10, 1997). Substantial reform of EPT was also advocated at this 
time by SARM president Sinclair Harrison. Harrison called on the provincial government to 
“take responsibility for schools” (Scott, December 19, 1996, p. A9). It‟s not clear if Harrison was 
advocating for full provincial general revenue funding of education, or removal of the taxing 
authority of school boards through implementation of a provincial EPT mill rate. Either way, it 
was SARM‟s position that the local autonomy of school boards should be sacrificed in favour of 
what they argued would be the more equitable system of provincially controlled education 
funding.  
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The Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS) 
represented the seasonal residential class of ratepayers. PARCS supported the reassessment, but 
in the autumn of 1996 called on the Government of Saskatchewan to exclude non-permanent 
resort cottage owners from the EPT base (Paulson, October 28, 1996). PARCS argued that 
seasonal residential EPT was inequitable, because school taxes made up 20% to 50% of urban 
assessments, while resort owners were paying 60% to 80% of their property taxes to school 
boards (Paulson, 28 October 1996). PARCS feared a spike in education property taxes due to the 
reassessment, and therefore sought a larger share of the provincial grant pool to help alleviate the 
property tax burden. Resort owners also argued that the EPT lacked accountability because 
seasonal residential property owners were not permitted to vote in school board elections, run for 
a school trustee position, or send their children to schools in the school division in which their 
resorts were located (Paulson, October 28, 1996). The seasonal residential property owners were 
tied to the school division in which their primary residence, not their seasonal residence, was 
located. 
The business lobby of the commercial and industrial property class was also critical of 
EPT policy during the 1997 reassessment. A number of different coalitions were formed amongst 
business associations. One such coalition was the Saskatoon Tax Freeze Committee, composed 
of local commercial interests. The committee, formed in the wake of the 1997 reassessment, 
called on Saskatoon city council to reduce mill rates by 1999 (Lyons, March 15, 1997). The 1997 
reassessment did not have a major effect on the commercial property class, but business 
lobbyists had longstanding grievances with property tax levels and the reassessment gave them a 
chance to publicize their concerns (G. Klein interview, 2011).  
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Municipal governments were key players throughout the reassessment. They were 
perceived as the face of local property taxation, and therefore were obligated to defend the 
necessity of the reassessment process (K. Pontikes interview, 2011). Urban municipalities were 
most vocal after the 1997 assessment had been implemented. The SUMA convention in the 
winter of 1997 spawned two resolutions by delegates (SUMA, 1997). A resolution calling on the 
provincial government to “remove a significant portion of education and school funding from the 
property tax base” was approved by SUMA members (SUMA, 1997, p. 2). The second 
resolution sought equitable assessment and taxation of urban properties through a provincial 
government amendment that would eliminate section 331(1)(q) of The Rural Municipality Act.  
Section 331(1)(q) had been adopted in 1989 to provide a tax exemption for rural residences by 
having the assessment of a farm residence reduced by the assessment of farmland (SARM, 
October 10, 1997).  The SUMA resolution indicated the sentiment that urban ratepayers felt they 
were being treated inequitably, in comparison to rural ratepayers, by the assessment and property 
taxation policies of the provincial government. 
The Saskatchewan School Trustees Association was largely absent from public 
participation in the political debate on the issue.
1
 They had little to gain by entering the public 
debate on property tax due to criticism of EPT by other stakeholders. A concerned individual, 
identified as a “Saskatoon resident”, questioned the absence of public commentary by school 
board trustees on the reassessment issue as follows: 
“I must admit that it interests me that the school boards are hiding under the table on this 
one. Most of my property tax bill goes to the school board, but no one seems to be putting 
trustees on the hot seat about how much we pay in tax. When one adds the money school 
                                                          
1
 The Saskatchewan School Trustees Association has since been renamed the Saskatchewan School Boards 
Association. 
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boards get from the province, they spend much more than city council. Yet few people 
ever go to school board meetings or question their efficiency. If we want our tax bills to 
be lower, perhaps we should yell at the school boards and not at city council” (Hamm, 
November 7, 1996). 
3.3 Government of Saskatchewan Reassessment Policies 
 The NDP government‟s involvement in the reassessment continued after assessment 
notices had been delivered to property owners. The government gauged the response of advocacy 
groups and enacted measures to mitigate political backlash. The issue remained on the provincial 
agenda until the conclusion of the spring sitting of the Legislature in May of 1997. The most 
significant initiative introduced by the government was an education tax factor for agricultural 
land. The tax factor initiative sought to “reduce the increase of education tax for agricultural land 
resulting from reassessment to an average of 5 per cent on a provincial basis” (Government of 
Saskatchewan, February 28, 1997). Urban municipalities argued that rural interests were being 
rewarded at their expense. They expected that they would be forced to subsidize the reduction in 
rural school taxes based on the zero sum argument that a tax break for farmers meant a tax hike 
for urban municipalities (Lyons, March 5, 1997). This conflict was a product of an urban-rural 
dichotomy that was present in Saskatchewan politics.  
During the policy announcement of an education tax factor for agricultural land, the 
provincial government also pledged its support for the continuing necessity of a locally 
controlled EPT. The NDP government promoted locally elected and accountable school boards 
as an important level of government, whose local control and responsibility depended on access 
to the property tax base for education purposes (Government of Saskatchewan, February 28, 
1997). This support for school board local autonomy and accountability was later repeated in the 
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official provincial response to a SUMA convention resolution that called for the removal of a 
substantial portion of the EPT from education funding (Atkinson, 1997). In the response, the 
province also pledged to reverse the increasing reliance on property taxes to fund education. The 
NDP government was pledging that it would find a balance between the interests of EPT critics 
and school boards. 
3.4 Summary and Analysis 
This chapter has revealed that the reassessment of 1997 elevated scrutiny of EPT due to 
long awaited property tax shifts. The provincial government‟s role was to release POVs and 
provide tools to municipalities for managing tax shifts. The worst outcomes were anticipated for 
agricultural interests. SARM sought to stall the reassessment for this reason, and then called for 
provincial control of education funding to correct perceived disparities due to EPT. Other 
organizations were compelled to criticize EPT during the reassessment process. PARCS argued 
that the EPT was unaccountable and unfair to the seasonal residential class. Business interests 
used the reassessment as an opportunity to criticize the perceived high levels of property taxes in 
general. SUMA sought a decrease in EPT, and treatment equal to rural municipalities. School 
boards kept a low profile during the reassessment. After the reassessment was completed, the 
provincial government introduced an education tax factor for agricultural land to deflate criticism 
of the EPT by rural ratepayers, but also defended the necessity of EPT for school board local 
autonomy. 
The provincial government managed its decision making role in the reassessment reform, 
and surrounding political discourse, by employing a mix of political rationality and policy 
rationales. The policy rationale of the reassessment reform was to achieve two key policy 
objectives. The policy objective of tax equity was improved in some respects by updating all 
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property assessments to reflect their current market value, while the policy objective of 
accountability was attained by exerting renewed provincial control over the assessment stage of 
the property tax process. The resulting tax shifts created a backlash amongst key advocacy 
groups based on the tax equity policy objective as it related the tax burden differences between 
property classes. This backlash put political pressure on the provincial government to provide a 
remedy. The provincial government‟s political rationality was to manage this problem with a 
policy that targeted the most influential critic. The political rationality of implementing the 
agricultural property tax factor was to win back the support of the agricultural sector with a 
targeted tax equity policy. When advocacy groups like SARM and SUMA called for even greater 
control over the effects of EPT, the provincial government responded to the criticism over 
inaction with an argument that defended the value of school board local autonomy as an 
important policy objective. Defending local autonomy also had a political rationality, as major 
changes to the EPT would place a financial burden on the provincial government to increase 
provincial transfers which it was not in a fiscal position to do at that time. After the impact of 
reassessment was experienced, a broad coalition of ratepayer advocacy groups from the 
municipal, business, and agricultural sectors began seeking the policy objective of tax relief. The 
political rationality and policy rationales of future reforms of the provincial government were 
responsive to this broad-based advocacy group demand. 
The focus of the next chapter is on a major initiative that was crafted in order to resolve a 
burgeoning debate on the proportions of funding that should be derived from the property tax 
base and provincial transfers. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE BOUGHEN COMMISSION 
 The Commission on Financing Kindergarten to Grade 12 Education, commonly known as 
the Boughen Commission, was an important consultation and EPT policy option formulation 
exercise carried out in 2003. This key initiative occurred in the context of the NDP‟s third 
consecutive mandate, which started in 1999 and concluded in 2003. With a general election 
being anticipated, the government appointed the Boughen Commission in May of 2003. The 
Commission concluded its work in December of 2003, after the NDP had been elected to a 
fourth consecutive term in office. The recommendations of the Boughen Commission‟s Finding 
the Balance report provided a clear EPT reform strategy that could have been adopted by the 
new government but was not.  
 A variety of stakeholder responses were registered during the months that followed the 
January 2004 release of Boughen‟s report. The government‟s response to the Commission report 
was expected by the time the budget was released in the spring. Advocacy group pressure 
increased when it was shown that the government was ignoring Boughen‟s recommendations in 
its budget. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the Boughen Commission‟s value as a key 
opportunity and standard for reform whose final report attracted the disapproval of some 
stakeholders and the support of others. 
4.1 Education Property Tax Policy, 1999 to 2003 
 Before appointing Ray Boughen to study the issue, the NDP government implemented 
several policies during its third term in office. The first of three EPT policies introduced by the 
NDP was a temporary EPT relief program called the Farm Land Property Tax Rebate. The policy 
was announced in the provincial budget of 2000, as a reaction to sustained pressure by the 
farming lobby. Two groups were pressuring the government for a response. The Coalition for the 
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Reduction of Education Tax on Agricultural Property was a pressure group active in the late 
1990s that represented six farms organizations and SARM. The Coalition‟s mission was to lobby 
for EPT relief, and the introduction of a more accountable and equitable education funding 
system (SARM, April 28, 1999). Running parallel to the demands of the Coalition were threats 
of a tax revolt in rural Saskatchewan in response to the 1997 reassessment outcomes for 
agricultural producers. In the fall of 1999, farmers in seven rural municipalities had voted to 
withhold their property tax payments from local governments until action was taken to relieve 
the EPT burden (Sinkewicz, October 12, 1999). The mounting pressure by farmers, who were 
supported by the Canadian Taxpayers Federation advocacy group, was opposed by SARM, 
individual rural municipalities, and school boards who stood to lose a major part of their tax 
revenues. SARM and the SSTA argued that tax revolts would simply lead to higher taxes in the 
long run because these local governments would need to take out costly loans to cover the 
shortfall in revenue from withheld taxes (Cabel, July 23, 1999). SARM and the SSTA urged 
farmers to get behind their ongoing lobbying efforts instead of engaging in tax revolts.  
The Farm Land Property Tax Rebate program, introduced in the March 29, 2000 
provincial budget, included $50 million of property tax relief, or 25% of the current school tax 
levy on farmland, divided between the tax years of 2000 and 2001 (Government of 
Saskatchewan, February 8, 2001). It was the first, and most notable, EPT policy introduced by 
the NDP during its 1999 to 2003 term. The government estimated that farmers would receive an 
average rebate of $450, reducing the total EPT load for the agricultural class from $140 million 
to $115 million per year (Government of Saskatchewan, July 19, 2000). SUMA and the SSTA 
emerged to criticize the policy. SUMA argued that property tax relief should be provided for all 
ratepayers by having the provincial government fund a larger portion of education (SUMA, 
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2000). The president of the SSTA agreed that a higher portion of education funding should come 
from provincial coffers, yet he was quick to add that some local taxes were necessary to protect 
school board local autonomy (Shaddock, January 27, 2000). SARM was positive but not fully 
satisfied in their response to the EPT relief plan. SARM president Sinclair Harrison stated the 
program was, “the first relief on agricultural education taxes in 25 years”, which was “at least a 
step in the right direction” (Schmidt, July 20, 2000). SARM quickly shifted their criticisms to the 
2001 reassessment policies released by the provincial government in the fall of 2000. 
The NDP‟s second EPT policy is found in the 2001 reassessment regulations released on 
November 8, 2000. Commentary was subdued compared to the controversy that arose during the 
1997 reassessment, but tax burden shifts did reward some and punish others. The most notable 
change was a reduction in the percentage of value (POV) for the arable agricultural property 
class, from 70% in 1997 to 55% for the 2001 reassessment. The government expected a savings 
of $15 million for agricultural landowners (Government of Saskatchewan, November 8, 2000). 
SARM argued that the new POVs did not go far enough to curb a tax increase for the agricultural 
property class (SARM, November 17, 2000). Harrison suggested that tax revolt meetings could 
return due to a perception that the regulations would provide inadequate assistance for farmers.  
Urban municipal governments and the business community criticized the NDP‟s 
reassessment policy. SUMA countered SARM‟s criticisms by arguing that the regulations 
represented a further shift of tax burden away from agricultural ratepayers onto residential and 
commercial ratepayers in cities, towns, and villages (McNairn, November 9, 2000). SUMA 
would further entrench this position by passing a resolution at their 2002 convention that called 
on the provincial government to provide the school tax rebates that rural ratepayers were 
receiving to urban ratepayers as well (SUMA, 2002). The business community reserved its 
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criticism for the assessment process itself, and largely ignored the percentage of value (POV) tax 
instruments, which continued to be set at 100% for the commercial class. The Saskatoon 
Chamber of Commerce called on the provincial government to introduce an income-based, 
annual assessment system like those in Alberta and B.C. (Paulson, December 7, 2000). The 
provincial government soon met The Chamber‟s demand. 
 The method used to assess commercial property was altered near the end of the NDP‟s 
third term to a more favourable approach for this property class. Saskatchewan Premier Lorne 
Calvert announced at the 2002 SUMA annual meeting that his government would introduce 
changes to the way SAMA assessed commercial property. SAMA would begin assessing 
commercial property based on the income approach instead of the market value approach used in 
1997. In a news release, the Premier added that, “many in the business, commercial and 
municipal sectors who have sought improvements to the valuation of commercial property for 
some time see the income approach as a way to improve property assessments while maintaining 
fairness and equity” (Government of Saskatchewan, February 4, 2002). Despite that promise to 
alter the valuation system, business groups would continue to criticize the EPT (Greater 
Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce, May 1, 2003).  
The common feature of the policies examined is that they all responded directly to a 
position that was taken by an advocacy group preceding adoption. The introduction of these 
policies was ultimately deemed insufficient by advocacy groups, who sought action on the 
funding ratio issue, which focussed on the split between provincial general revenue fund 
transfers to education property tax used to fund education. A commission would be needed to 
review policy options and formulate a strategy for change. Regardless of the NDP government‟s 
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motivation to appoint a commission on the eve of an election, it satisfied demands for action 
when it was initiated. 
4.2 The Boughen Commission Recommendations and Advocacy Group Responses 
 The Boughen Commission was asked to examine four issues when it was appointed on 
May 2, 2003. Commissioner Ray Boughen was expected to investigate the education funding 
ratio, find sources of taxation other than property taxes for funding education, seek equity in 
education property taxation among property classes, and investigate equity in the fiscal capacity 
among school divisions (Government of Saskatchewan, May 2, 2003). The next day, SARM 
president Neal Hardy called on the provincial government to freeze school mill rates until the 
Commission had reported (Silverthorn & Wood, May 3, 2003). This request was ignored. During 
the Commission‟s research and consultation process, SUMA president Mike Badham called on 
the provincial government for greater provincial funding for education, but he added that there 
was still room for some EPT for the sake of local autonomy of school boards (Block, August 26, 
2003). This contrasted with the SARM position arguing for full provincial funding of education. 
Throughout the proceedings of the Commission, Ray Boughen emphasized that the “big 
purpose” of the Commission was to address the funding ratio, in other words, the proper balance 
between provincial funding and local property tax (Government of Saskatchewan, May 2, 2003; 
Block, August 26, 2003). The “Finding the Balance” tagline for the final report is the first clue 
that Boughen had stayed true to his vision of addressing the funding ratio. The 12 
recommendations contained within the report confirm it. 
 The Boughen Commission final report was released on January 8, 2004. The centrepiece 
of the dozen recommendations was a two stage approach to increasing the provincial portion of 
the education funding ratio (Boughen, 2003). First, Boughen argued that the funding ratio would 
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need to be gradually inverted and expanded from 60% property taxes and 40% provincial 
funding, to 30% property taxes and 70% provincial funding. Second, this reform should be made 
possible by raising the Provincial Sales Tax (PST) one point and extending coverage of the tax to 
include restaurant meals. Boughen also recommended the introduction of a uniform provincial 
mill rate on commercial property, which would be set in the provincial budget (Boughen, 2003). 
This uniform mill rate policy option is a targeted version of the uniform, provincially-controlled 
mill rate that would be introduced by the Saskatchewan Party in the provincial budget of 2009. 
Boughen also recommended the appointment of a task force on revising school division 
boundaries for the sake of increased equity (Boughen, 2003). This was one recommendation the 
NDP government did adopt. One other noteworthy recommendation called on the provincial 
government to remove seasonal residential property from the education property tax base 
(Boughen, 2003). This is a direct response to the criticisms that PARCS raised during the 1997 
reassessment.  
 Advocacy group positions focussed on the centrepiece recommendations of changing the 
funding ratio by raising the PST. The report was made available to the public in the beginning of 
January, 2004. The government withheld immediate comment on the report, as it planned to 
“provide a substantive response in the coming months” (Government of Saskatchewan, January 
8, 2004). The advocacy group responses immediately after release of the final report were 
therefore focussed on Boughen‟s recommendations, not on the government‟s response to the 
recommendations. An article by Leader Post reporter James Wood captured the reactions of key 
stakeholders on the main issues (Wood, January 9, 2004). SARM president Hardy argued that 
raising the PST to provide property tax relief merely shifted the tax load from property tax to 
sales tax with no net improvement. Lance Bean, the president of the SSBA, supported increased 
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provincial funding, and felt it was up to the province to decide if it would be achieved by raising 
the PST. Bean also supported further school board amalgamation, as long as it was voluntary. 
Clay Dowling, president of the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, was opposed to raising 
the PST because he believed it would punish the business class more than other ratepayers. 
Further, he suggested that extra provincial funding for education be achieved by finding 
efficiencies within the administration of the provincial government. During recent advocacy 
group commentary on key initiatives by the provincial government, SUMA had not aligned with 
SARM‟s position that the province should fully fund education from general revenues. Similarly, 
SUMA diverged from SARM on the Boughen recommendations. SUMA argued that an 
increased sales tax could be justified if it meant that property taxes would be reduced. 
Three positions gained prominence before the provincial budget was released. A few 
weeks after release of the final report, delegates at the SUMA annual meeting took a bold stance 
on the EPT. A resolution calling for removal of the EPT from the funding of education was 
accepted by delegates (SUMA, 2004).  In adopting this resolution, SUMA members were 
effectively siding with SARM‟s leadership and membership, rather than with their own SUMA 
leadership. SARM continued to take a hard-line stance on the issue. The delegates of the SARM 
convention, which took place in mid-March of 2004, voted to start confronting the education tax 
issue by establishing an emergency convention, if it was not addressed in the upcoming 
provincial budget (SARM, March 18, 2004). A new actor emerged to lobby on a more specific 
issue. The restaurant lobby quickly mobilized to prevent the provincial government from 
adopting the Boughen recommendation of extending the PST to cover restaurant meals. The 
Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association (CFRA) organized dramatic protests to 
demonstrate their opposition to the restaurant sales tax. On March 25
th
, restaurateurs delivered 
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132,355 petition signatures stuffed in fried chicken buckets to the legislature (Ehrkamp, March 
25, 2004).  The following day, the CFRA delivered 70 pizzas to NDP and Saskatchewan Party 
MLAs with one slice missing from each pizza box. The message was, “don‟t take a slice out of 
our business” (O‟Connor, March 26, 2004). The effectiveness of the theatrical pressure 
campaign is difficult to measure, but the outcome was favourable for the CFRA. 
4.3 The Provincial Budget of 2004 
 The NDP government ignored the main recommendations of the Boughen Commission 
when it announced its 2004 provincial budget on March 31, 2004. Political motivations and other 
priorities may have been the cause. The political motivation may have been based on using the 
commission as a way to move the EPT reform issue to the backburner during an election 
campaign. Alternatively, other priorities may have caused the government to ignore Boughen‟s 
main recommendation. In an interesting twist, the NDP decided to heed the recommendation of 
raising the PST one point, but to the dismay of education groups, the revenue windfall was 
assigned to healthcare not education. This was not surprising for those who recognized that 
education had a long history of being a secondary concern to the priority of healthcare, which 
was taking up the largest proportion of provincial budget dollars (H. Langlois interview, 2011). 
The demands of restaurateurs had been heeded, as the PST was not extended to cover restaurant 
meals. Absent was a plan to reduce the EPT burden or increase provincial funding for education. 
SARM attacked the provincial government for ignoring EPT relief in the budget. Hardy 
criticized a PST increase that was not tied to property tax relief, and was equally disappointed by 
a K-12 funding plan that he saw as only covering the recent increase in teachers‟ salaries 
(SARM, March 31, 2004). He maintained that SARM‟s special convention on EPT would go 
ahead. New SUMA president Don Schlosser on the other hand was pleased that funds were being 
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directed to urban municipalities due to unrelated measures in the budget (Cooper, April 1, 2004). 
The government‟s budget had continued the three-year trend of increasing municipal revenue-
sharing grants by $10 million, which in 2004 meant a 13% increase over 2003 grants 
(Government of Saskatchewan, March 31, 2004). SARM was also critical of the municipal 
grants due to the amounts earmarked for urban compared to rural municipalities. Schlosser 
meanwhile was optimistic that EPT reform, and other Boughen Commission recommendations, 
would be acted on in the near future (Cooper, April 1, 2004).  
The new leader of the Official Opposition, Brad Wall, grilled the government on the EPT 
issue during the budget debates. On the topic of “Pre-budget commitments”, Wall argued in the 
Legislature that Premier Calvert had said he had no mandate for a PST increase and that we was 
not going to increase taxes (Wall, March 31,  2004). Wall added that the Premier had pledged to 
SARM that there would be property tax relief.  On both of these counts, Wall believed that the 
NDP Premier had failed. Two days after the budget was released, Boughen told the media that he 
expected that his recommendations for providing property tax relief were now dead (Wood, 
April 2, 2004). A short term approach for addressing EPT issues would continue into the NDP‟s 
fourth term. 
4.4 Summary and Analysis 
 This chapter has revealed that the NDP government appointed the Boughen Commission 
to investigate the EPT issues but did not adopt the main recommendation of the final report. 
Leading up to the commission, three policies were implemented that temporarily appeased 
stakeholder demands on EPT relief including agricultural tax relief through a rebate program, a 
lower POV for arable agricultural land, and adoption of the income approach for commercial 
class assessment. The Boughen Commission investigated the funding ratio between local and 
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provincial revenue sources, the tax equity issue, the funding equity issue, and appropriate 
funding sources for a greater provincial contribution to education funding. Boughen 
recommended a substantial shift in the funding ratio, from 60-40 to 30-70, to be primarily 
financed by assigning a 1% PST hike to education and extending the sales tax to cover restaurant 
meals. The stakeholder response was mixed. The government decided to ignore this main 
recommendation in the 2004 provincial budget. The pressure intensified for provincial action on 
EPT. Within weeks of the budget, the NDP‟s response began to take form. 
 The provincial government employed a mix of political rationality and policy rationales 
as it managed the policy formulation exercise of the Boughen Commission and the decision 
making exercise involved in tax relief reform. The main policy rationale of the tax rebate 
program was tax relief and tax equity. But this reform owed more to a political rationality. 
Agricultural groups and the Canadian Taxpayers Federation used tax revolt and coalition 
building tactics to put pressure on the provincial government for tax relief. The rebate policy 
responded to that political pressure without the fiscal and political resources required of major, 
long term EPT reform. The main policy rationale of establishing the Boughen Commission was 
the policy objective of determining a proper balance of funding sources. Underlying this aim was 
the goal of defining the role of the policy objectives like tax relief, education funding equity, and 
school board local autonomy in a reform policy option. The government‟s refusal to adopt the 
main recommendation of the commission report, yet its willingness to raise the PST by one point 
and assign it to healthcare, demonstrated that the decision to appoint the commission was likely 
based on a political rationality that relied on shrewd political tactics. Appointing a commission 
on the eve of an election allowed the NDP to prevent EPT from becoming a wedge issue for the 
Saskatchewan Party, as it stalled debate until the commission completed its report. The responses 
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by advocacy groups to the Boughen recommendations were mixed, but the response of SARM to 
government inaction during the 2004 provincial budget was outrage at the lack of tax relief and 
tax equity measures for the agricultural property class.  
As the next chapter reveals, the government‟s plan of action for addressing the EPT issue 
was met with substantial criticism and resistance from influential advocacy groups.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
TAX REVOLT AND THE NDP‟S ACTION PLAN 
 Advocacy groups seeking EPT reform were disappointed by the NDP government‟s 
budget in the spring of 2004. SARM was the prominent example as it revived its lobbying 
campaign to continue pressuring the government. A tax revolt by rural municipalities, which was 
not sanctioned by SARM, paralleled SARM‟s own conventional lobbying campaign. Calvert 
responded with a threefold plan, including school division amalgamation, linking equalization 
dollars to EPT relief, and extension of EPT relief when these new revenue streams were attained 
(Calvert, June 10, 2004). The EPT relief included major tax relief for the agricultural property 
class ratepayers, as well as more modest tax relief for all other ratepayers. Advocacy groups 
responded to these initiatives by continuing to push for more change. Besides establishing 
strategic lobbying alliances with other advocacy groups, school boards also launched lawsuits 
against the tax revolts and sought court orders against mandatory amalgamation. SUMA and 
SARM continued to hold contrasting positions, as SUMA‟s more passive support for EPT reform 
was at odds with the aggressive tone of SARM‟s constituency. Business groups remained 
consistent in their advocacy for EPT relief and reform based on economic arguments. The 
lobbying efforts of advocacy groups and the NDP‟s policies in its final term in office are the 
topics of this chapter. 
5.1 Tax Revolt 
 SARM responded to the provincial budget of 2004 with a battle cry and a major counter-
offensive. In a news release entitled “Call to Arms for Rural Saskatchewan”, SARM directed its 
members to attend an emergency convention on the education tax (SARM, April 2, 2004). The 
1000 person convention on April 22
 in Regina was parlayed into the “Call to Action Rally”, 
which took place on June 10 at the Legislature. A variety of official and unofficial political 
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activities coalesced on that day in Regina. High level meetings were held between the Premier 
and SARM leaders; a petition with more than 14000 signatures was presented by SARM; 300 
people rallied on the legislative grounds; and the legislative proceedings of the day were 
dominated by official opposition questions and criticisms levelled at the government‟s EPT 
policies (Wood, June 11, 2004; SARM, June 10, 2004; Calvert, June 10, 2004). SUMA was 
notably absent from participation in the June 10 political rally. SUMA president Don Schlosser 
defended SUMA‟s absence and pledged support for EPT relief in an op-ed piece in the Leader 
Post the following week (June 17, 2004). Schlosser cited SUMA‟s recent efforts as evidence of 
its solidarity with SARM. He pointed to two resolutions by SUMA delegates, one that had been 
passed in support of the Boughen Commission findings, and another that called for complete 
removal of education costs from the property tax base (Schlosser, June 17, 2004). The latter of 
these actions resonated with SARM‟s intentions and aligned the two organizations on an 
important issue. The former argument was a weaker case for solidarity because SARM had been 
critical of Boughen‟s report. 
 Following in the wake of the call to action rally, a loosely bound group of rural 
municipalities known as the Tax Action Group rejuvenated the tax revolt tactic starting in 2004.    
There were a couple of critical differences between the new tax revolt and the 1999 tax revolt. 
First, the new tax revolt witnessed rural municipalities pressuring the provincial government to 
provide EPT relief by refusing to hand property tax revenues over to school divisions, whereas 
the tax revolt of 1999 was comprised of farmers seeking to influence the provincial government 
to provide EPT relief by refusing to hand taxes over to rural municipalities. The second 
difference between the two tax revolts was that the new revolt was more unyielding and 
widespread than the 1999 tax revolt due to the large number of rural municipalities that joined 
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the action. SARM did not officially endorse the activities of the Tax Action Group because of 
the illegality involved in withholding education property taxes from school divisions.  
The new tax revolt was launched when the rural municipality of Scott violated the legal 
obligation to hand over EPT revenues to their local school divisions in November of 2004. The 
Scott RM was promptly sued by the Sunrise School Division in February of 2005 (Pruden, 
February 5, 2005). The provincial government‟s announcement of tax relief in January 6, 2005 
did not slow down the momentum started by the Scott RM revolt. By November 2005 there were 
51 rural municipalities withholding property taxes from school boards, and by January 2006 
there was 104 rural municipalities involved (Brownlee, January 5, 2006). Glenn Blakley, a 
councillor from the Spy Hill Rural Municipality, became identified as the leader of the loosely 
bound Tax Action Group. Blakley and the Tax Action Group were calling for a 25% reduction in 
property taxes in 2006, with 10% reductions following in the years 2007 through 2009 
(Brownlee, January 5, 2006). The provincial government responded with tax relief, and a policy 
that reminded rural municipalities of their duty to hand over EPT funds. The reminder came in 
the form of government legislation, which bound municipalities to transfer EPT to school 
divisions in “a timely fashion” (Government of Saskatchewan, November 6, 2006). The 
legislation affirmed the provincial government‟s existing policy that tax revolts were illegal and 
would not be tolerated. 
5.2 The NDP’s Action Plan: Amalgamation, Tax Relief, and a New Equalization Deal 
In 2004, Premier Calvert responded to SARM‟s “Day of Action” with a three-fold plan of 
action. The first action was school division amalgamation. The Education Equity Task Force was 
established on May 31, 2004 to develop a map of new school division boundaries. The provincial 
government had decided to move forward with mandatory amalgamation and therefore 
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abandoned the policy it adopted in 1995 of providing incentives for voluntary amalgamation. 
The rationale for this policy was that education equity would be improved through regional 
pooling of assessment wealth. Part of the policy rationale was that this approach to equity was 
the preferred provincial government option over other options that would more directly 
undermine school board local autonomy such as full provincial general revenue funding of 
education (Education Equity Project, November 10, 2004). The justification for introducing 
mandatory amalgamation was that restructuring rural school divisions would improve 
efficiencies, reduce tax and service inequities, and facilitate property tax relief (Wood, 
September 8, 2005). The findings of the task force shaped the amalgamation plan that was 
adopted in November of 2004. School divisions were reduced from 81 to 34 through mandatory 
amalgamation, and further decreased to 28 through voluntary amalgamation of Catholic school 
divisions (Saskatchewan Learning, 2006). Dolmage and Clarke predicted that restructuring was a 
precursor for the development of a new system of collection and redistribution of education 
resources in the province (Clarke & Dolmage, 2006). The authors were not expecting or 
advocating for the type of EPT reform that was introduced in 2009, but they did recognize that 
the amalgamation would be a precursor to fundamental reforms to education tax authority and 
funding. 
The amalgamation process exacerbated the urban and rural policy divergence. SARM 
called on the Government of Saskatchewan to abandon the mandatory amalgamation plan and 
prove that it was not going to shift the EPT burden to rural areas through the process of 
restructuring school divisions (SARM, 2005). During the same period, rural school divisions 
teamed up with rural municipalities, towns, and villages to seek a court order against mandatory 
amalgamation (Mandryk, May 25, 2005). The legal actions of select rural school divisions were 
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at odds with the official position of the SSBA. Bill Wells, executive director of the SSBA at the 
time, argued that school boards did not want to expend political capital on opposing mandatory 
amalgamation because of concerns that it could have led to further losses of autonomy (B. Wells 
interview, 2011). Wells believed that a deferential approach proved wise because unlike similar 
reform exercises in other Canadian provinces, the school boards in Saskatchewan did not lose the 
authority to set mill rates at the same time as amalgamation. SUMA struck a sympathetic stance 
with SARM and the faction of rural school divisions on the issue of mandatory amalgamation. 
SUMA passed a resolution at its 2005 annual meeting that sought a more “open and flexible” 
amalgamation approach for rural communities instead of having “amalgamations forced upon 
them by the Government” (SUMA, 2005). SUMA did not oppose amalgamation, but merely 
called for a more flexible and responsive approach on the part of the provincial government to 
the concerns being expressed by SARM and SSBA members. 
School closures were an issue related to amalgamation that demonstrated the NDP 
government‟s motive for supporting school board autonomy. This motive was based in part on 
avoiding the political trappings of being responsible for shutting down a school. A moratorium 
on school closures was established while restructuring was completed from late 2004 to the end 
of 2006. This provincial government policy created a backlog of school closures. There were 50 
schools slated for closure by the time the moratorium ended in 2007. The closures were 
concentrated in rural Saskatchewan. As amalgamation was nearing completion, SARM 
responded to impending 2007 school closures with a resolution calling on the provincial 
government to establish a five-year moratorium (SARM, 2007). The government deflected 
SARM‟s appeal by defending school board local autonomy and their legal authority to close a 
school if they considered it necessary (SARM, 2007). The government‟s defence of local 
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autonomy at this particular juncture reflects the convenience of avoiding responsibility for school 
closures. In Boughen‟s final report three years earlier, he highlighted the political motive of the 
provincial government for protecting school board autonomy as follows: “Provincial 
governments recognize that local governance of education has prevented operating decisions, 
such as school closures, bussing routes, staffing and student discipline, from becoming issues for 
the province to manage” (Boughen, 2003: p. 50). In this instance, the NDP government used the 
local autonomy policy rationale to evade accountability for school closures (K. Pontikes 
interview, 2011).  
 The NDP government‟s second initiative was to link EPT relief to federal equalization. 
Premier Calvert established the connection during SARM‟s “Day of Action” rally in 2004 at the 
Legislature. He argued that a “fair” equalization deal for Saskatchewan would produce the 
financial resources, “which we can use very directly to lower the burden on the property tax 
base” (Calvert, June 10, 2004). SARM was onside with the Premier‟s proposal. The day after 
SARM‟s “Day of Action”, president Neal Hardy agreed to be part of a provincial delegation to 
Ottawa to discuss equalization (Wood, June 11, 2004). Calvert made the equalization fight a 
priority between the years of 2004 and 2007, which he expected would bring Saskatchewan an 
additional $800 million if successful (Government of Saskatchewan, October 11, 2006). At the 
2007 SUMA annual meeting, a resolution pledging support for the provincial government‟s 
campaign for a better equalization deal received unanimous support from delegates (SUMA, 
2007). Some informed observers believed that the NDP‟s policy was crafted to shift political 
accountability to the federal government for EPT relief (G. Klein interview, 2011). Regardless of 
the motivation, it was in the interest of all education tax advocacy groups to support the 
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provincial government‟s fight for more equalization dollars. The more dollars in provincial 
coffers, the more likely their tax relief and increased education funding goals would be realized. 
 The third and most significant initiative undertaken by the NDP government between 
2004 and 2007 was EPT relief. In early 2005, the government introduced a two-year $110 
million property tax credit program for all Saskatchewan ratepayers for 2005 and 2006. It was 
the first property tax relief program since the Romanow government‟s Farm Land Property Tax 
Rebate program expired in 2001. The average tax credit for the new program was 8% of the EPT 
levy, with a cap of $2500 on commercial/industrial and multi-unit residential properties. The 
government acknowledged that it was a short-term solution to the issue (Government of 
Saskatchewan, January 6, 2005). In a Leader Post piece covering the NDP‟s initiative, reporter 
James Wood gauged the reaction from advocacy groups to the two-year property tax credit 
program (Wood, January 7, 2005). SARM argued that agricultural and residential tax relief 
should have been prioritized over commercial tax relief. The SSBA welcomed the tax relief but 
called on the government to match it with a commitment to produce adequate provincial funding 
for education. The SSBA‟s critique centred on the correlation between perceived provincial 
underfunding of education, the perceived overreliance on EPT by school divisions to make up 
the difference, and the level of EPT paid by property owners. SUMA was pleased that the 
program would apply tax relief to all the different categories of property. The Greater Saskatoon 
Chamber of Commerce took the critical position that the relief policies did little to reduce the 
high tax load on businesses (The Chamber, January 6, 2005). A notable critique came from the 
Saskatchewan Real Estate Association (SREA), a lobby organization for the housing sector. The 
SREA saw the tax relief program as flawed because it didn‟t restrict school boards from raising 
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mill rates (Lyons, January 13, 2005). The organization argued that the provincial government 
should mandate mill rate caps for school divisions. 
In 2006, the NDP government substantially boosted tax relief to agricultural ratepayers in 
its tax relief package, by providing $52.8 million in agricultural tax credits. Two policy 
outcomes were achieved by the targeted relief. First, the program allowed the government to 
boost the tax credit for the agricultural class from 8% to 38%. Secondly, a 60-40 ratio of 
provincial to local funding for agricultural ratepayers was achieved by this action. The Boughen 
Commission had recommended a similar ratio of 60-40 for all ratepayers, not just agricultural 
producers. The targeted tax relief was welcomed by SARM. President Neal Hardy stated that, 
“the provincial government has correctly identified that agricultural producers have the greatest 
need for immediate education property tax relief” (SARM, March 3, 2006). Calvert trumpeted 
the reform as „ongoing, stable, and long term‟ (Government of Saskatchewan, March 3, 2006). 
The long term commitment was a departure from the temporary nature of the Farm Land 
Property Tax Rebate program of 2000 and 2001. Calvert continued to link equalization to tax 
relief when he stated that an improved equalization deal would provide the finances to extend the 
tax relief implicit in a 60-40 ratio of provincial to local funds to all ratepayers in a long term and 
sustainable manner (Government of Saskatchewan, March 3, 2006). The NDP‟s reform policy 
reflects a prioritization of agricultural interests, with the promise that tax relief would soon be 
extended to the urban interests of the residential and commercial property classes. 
The 60-40 pledge aligned the government with the primary advocacy groups. These 
organizations had agreed to a common position on the policy of 60-40 funding of education in 
the fall of 2005. The SSBA, Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, and PARCS pledged 
solidarity with SARM and SUMA when they aligned their advocacy on reducing education taxes 
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on property by forming the Education Property Tax Coalition. The Coalition called for an 
increase in the government share of education funding to 60 per cent by 2008 (B. Wells, October 
17, 2005). The SSBA was motivated to protect its local autonomy from being undermined by 
complete provincial funding of education when it decided to align with the other advocacy 
groups on this issue for the first time (SSBA, 2005).  
In 2007, an incremental change to the tax credit program was introduced, which extended 
the 38% tax credit for agricultural producers for another year, and also increased the tax credit 
for all other ratepayers from 8% to 10%. The government continued to tie tax relief to 
equalization. The NDP announced that the relief was achieved through allocation of 30% of a 
one-time federal equalization influx of $226 million (Government of Saskatchewan, April 23, 
2007). The government‟s 2007 plan affirmed the commitment to a 60-40 ratio of provincial to 
property tax funding for agricultural producers, and included a modest 2% hike in the tax credit 
for all other ratepayers. 
5.3 Summary and Analysis 
The NDP introduced three initiatives after being pressured to act by the rallies and tax 
revolts organized either by SARM or the Tax Action Group. First, it reduced school divisions 
from 81 to 28 in 2004. The issue of school closures spun off from amalgamations, with the 
government defending local autonomy to avoid responsibility for the mostly rural impact. 
Second, the NDP government linked federal equalization to EPT relief starting in 2004. The third 
action by the NDP government was the tax relief program. The tax relief program had three 
stages. First, an 8% tax credit for all ratepayers was introduced for the 2005 and 2006 tax years. 
This program was extended into 2007 and expanded to a 10% tax credit. In 2006 and 2007, a 
targeted relief program was created for the agricultural class with a 38% tax credit. These two 
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programs brought a 60-40 funding ratio to the agricultural class and the promise of a 60-40 
funding ratio for all property classes pending more equalization dollars. The SSBA deferred to 
the province on amalgamation, but achieved a victory when it moderated the positions of other 
advocacy groups with the joint position of a 60-40 funding ratio, which mitigated the threat to 
local autonomy of full provincial funding. The joint position was adopted in 2005 by the 
Education Property Tax Coalition. The Coalition‟s joint position, and the NDP‟s record on EPT, 
had been cast when the Saskatchewan Party emerged with more ambitious promises in the 2007 
general election.  
 During its last term in office, the NDP government‟s decisions were influenced by a 
combination of interrelated political rationality and policy rationales. The overarching strategy 
was to win back the political support of its critics and implement a package of reforms that 
would achieve its policy objectives. The policy rationale of mandatory amalgamation was to 
force change on school divisions in order to achieve policy objectives such as education funding 
equity, tax equity, efficiencies in operation, and tax relief by enlarging the geographical and 
operational size of school divisions. The policy rationale of the EPT credit program was to 
achieve the policy objectives of tax relief for all ratepayers, and tax equity through a higher level 
of tax relief for the agricultural property class. The tax revolt led by the Tax Action Group and 
conventional pressure campaign led by SARM exerted political pressure on the provincial 
government to respond. The extra tax relief for the agricultural property class suggests that the 
government‟s creation of the EPT credit program was influenced by political rationality related 
to winning agricultural groups‟ support. What was more clearly motivated by political 
considerations was the linkage created by the NDP government between federal equalization 
dollars and EPT relief. This strategy attempted to shift political accountability regarding EPT 
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relief onto the federal government. The provincial government hoped that this linkage would 
shift some of the blame to the federal government for lack of progress of at least for slow 
progress on EPT reform. The formation of the Education Property Tax Coalition also had a 
notable influence on the political rationality for tax relief, as the 60-40 funding ratio adopted by 
the group in 2005 was later acknowledged as a policy objective of the provincial government. 
The next chapter will examine the importance of the 2007 election, and resulting change 
in government, for EPT reform. 
 
 51 
 
CHAPTER 6:  
THE EDUCATION PROPERTY TAX IN  
THE 2007 SASKATCHEWAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
The 2007 election was the turning point in Saskatchewan‟s EPT policy. The NDP 
dropped the writ for a general election on October 10, 2007 that would be held November 7. The 
EPT had a much higher profile in the 2007 election than it did in either the 1999 or the 2003 
elections. It featured prominently in party platforms and was referenced often in campaign 
promises. The lobbying of advocacy groups was subdued during the campaign and the month 
following the election when the Saskatchewan Party cabinet was being determined. The two 
major parties took similar positions on the main issues, yet the Saskatchewan Party‟s victory 
altered the dynamics of provincial political leadership by increasing rural representation (Leeson, 
2009). After the 2007 election, the groundwork for major EPT reform was influenced by the 
Saskatchewan Party‟s rural base. This EPT reform was not immediate, but the mandate for 
reform was clear. This chapter starts by reviewing the political dynamics of elections in 
Saskatchewan in 1999 and 2003 and then examines the campaign platforms and promises of the 
two major parties in the 2007 election. The chapter continues with a discussion of cabinet 
representation in the new government and how the composition of the new government 
influenced the shape of the Saskatchewan Party‟s property tax initiatives. 
6.1 The Urban-Rural Dynamic of Saskatchewan’s Electoral Politics 
The founding of the Saskatchewan Party in 1997 and deteriorating support in rural areas 
for the NDP shaped the outcome of the 2007 election. The urban-rural divide in electoral politics 
between the Saskatchewan Party and the NDP emerged in the 1999 and 2003 elections. The 
NDP‟s share of seats in the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan dropped to 29 of 58 seats 
after the 1999 provincial election. The NDP had lost 13 seats during this first campaign that had 
featured Saskatchewan Party representation. The NDP losses in 1999 were focussed in rural 
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Saskatchewan, where the party was reduced to a single rural seat (Stirling, 2001). Four Liberal 
and zero Progressive Conservative MLAs were elected in 1999, down from eleven and five 
respectively in the 1995 election. Every party lost seats in the 1999 election except for the 
Saskatchewan Party, which established a rural stronghold by winning 25 seats. The 
Saskatchewan Party continued to hold its rural base in 2003 with 24 seats, while gaining four 
urban seats (CBC, November 5, 2003). The Liberals were shut out of the legislature in the 2003 
election, establishing the two-party system that remains in place as of 2011. Urban gains 
continued for the Saskatchewan Party in 2007, resulting in an electoral triumph of 38 out of 58 
seats (Elections Saskatchewan, 2011). The Saskatchewan Party‟s rural base of support was 
affirmed during the 2007 campaign.  
Party leader Brad Wall made a campaign promise that electing a Saskatchewan Party 
government would establish a new relationship between the provincial government and rural 
Saskatchewan (Wood, November 2, 2007). The Saskatchewan Party leader argued that his party 
had MLAs who lived in rural Saskatchewan, worked as agricultural producers, and were 
therefore better positioned to understand and represent rural issues (Wood, November 2, 2007). 
Given the Saskatchewan Party‟s stranglehold in rural areas, the focus of the election campaign 
for the two parties became the urban areas and particularly the cities of Saskatoon and Regina. 
(CBC, October 29, 2007). Brad Wall‟s leadership was crucial for restraining the rural instincts of 
his party, discarding ideology for electoral viability, and ultimately making the Saskatchewan 
Party a more desirable choice for urban voters (Leeson, 2008). Under Wall‟s leadership, the 
Saskatchewan Party shifted its stance on perennial issues like health care and Crown 
corporations closer to the NDP (Leeson, 2008). The convergence of policy positions between the 
two major parties was less apparent on the policy issue of education property tax. 
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6.2 Election Platforms and Promises 
 The EPT was featured prominently in the 2007 election platforms of the two parties. The 
NDP ran on its record of tax credits and targeted agricultural EPT relief, while offering promises 
of increased EPT relief (NDP platform, 2007). It pledged to continue producing a 60-40 ratio of 
provincial funding to local taxes for education from the agricultural class. The NDP also pledged 
to continue its EPT credit program for all other ratepayers and sweeten it with an income tax 
credit for homeowners and renters on the cost of their residential class education property taxes. 
The pledge to reduce taxes for renters due to EPT was a novel one because the EPT tax that 
rental tenants paid was hidden in the total bill for rent and therefore had often been ignored in the 
EPT debates over the years. EPT reductions for homeowners and rental tenants would be 
achieved with a 30% provincial income tax credit. These NDP pledges on EPT policy added an 
incremental boost to its ongoing tax credit program, which had consisted of substantial 
agricultural tax relief and less significant relief for all other ratepayers. 
 The Saskatchewan Party presented a clear alternative on EPT in its election platform. 
Three pledges were made during the campaign (Saskatchewan Party platform, 2007). First, the 
party promised to double EPT rebates over the course of four years for residential and 
agricultural ratepayers. Recognizing the interconnection between education tax relief and 
increased provincial funding for education, the Saskatchewan Party pledged to increase 
education funding by 20% to address the funding ratio issue. The Saskatchewan Party did not 
make a specific commitment to remove taxing authority from school boards and introduce a 
uniform provincial mill rate, but the party promised to implement the following change: 
“The Saskatchewan Party plan to increase education property tax rebates is the first step in 
our commitment to achieve a fairer balance for education funding. A Saskatchewan Party 
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government will work with school boards and consult with Saskatchewan people to 
determine the best way to ensure K-12 education is properly funded and that the education 
portion of property taxes is further reduced” (Saskatchewan Party platform, 2007, p. 14). 
The promise for a “fairer balance” for education funding planted a seed that would be nurtured 
during the course of the campaign. 
Eight days after the campaign started, the media spotlight shone on the EPT issue. 
Planned election advertising information was leaked by the Saskatchewan Party on October 14 
(Hall, October 15, 2007). The party‟s promises for EPT relief and reform were exposed before a 
formal announcement was made, leading to commentary by the media and the NDP. The next 
day, the EPT issue was featured prominently in campaign coverage. Saskatchewan Party leader 
Brad Wall criticized the NDP‟s record on EPT reform. He argued that the long-term solution to 
the issue was “education funding coming from government, coming from general revenue funds” 
(Wood, October 15, 2007, p. 1). Wall was indicating a preference for full provincial funding of 
education. The centralization of education funding implicit in Wall‟s commitment represented a 
departure from the NDP‟s approach of balancing the local autonomy of school boards with 
incremental measures like amalgamation and EPT relief.  
Advocacy groups emerged as the EPT issue held the spotlight. Reporter James Wood 
captured the diverse viewpoints on this issue in an article in The StarPhoenix (Wood, October 
15, 2007). The SSBA argued that provincial funding levels was the key issue, as the level of 
education property taxes required to finance education was dependent on the level of provincial 
transfers for education. The Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce argued that both parties were 
offering only temporary solutions to a problem that they viewed as needing a permanent fix. The 
Agricultural Producers Association of Saskatchewan endorsed the Saskatchewan Party‟s 
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proposal of funding more or all of education from provincial general revenue instead of property 
tax. Two weeks later, the media spotlight was on resort owners. The Saskatchewan Rivers 
constituency, which had a high concentration of resorts, was expected to be a tight race. Resort 
residents identified education property taxes as a major issue, and agreed with the Saskatchewan 
Party proposal that a larger portion of education should come from provincial general revenue. 
Saskatchewan Party candidate Nadine Wilson went on to win the riding over incumbent New 
Democratic Party MLA Lon Borgerson by a comfortable 13 point margin (Elections 
Saskatchewan, 2011). Voters, and most advocacy groups, were embracing a new direction and 
new leadership on EPT policy. 
 The proposals offered by the two parties represented clear choices. The NDP proposed 
continuity of the policies it had developed during its previous term in office, along with greater 
targeted tax relief for the residential property class, including renters in the multi-unit residential 
class. The Saskatchewan Party offered to double EPT rebates for agricultural and residential 
ratepayers, increase provincial general revenue funding of education, and consult with 
stakeholders in order to produce a “long term solution for education funding in the province” (LP 
Issues & Answers, November 5, 2007, p. B6). Education property tax would not make or break 
the main parties in the election, but it did feature prominently during the 2007 campaign. It was a 
key issue that compelled some Saskatchewan voters to choose change. 
6.3 The New Government and the Property Tax Initiative 
 The sixteen-year, four-term run of the NDP ended on November 7, 2007. The 
Saskatchewan Party won a clear mandate, taking 38 of 58 seats with 50.92% of the popular vote 
compared to 20 seats and 37.24% of the popular vote for the NDP (Elections Saskatchewan, 
2011). The new government began laying the groundwork for EPT reform with its cabinet 
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appointments. The new cabinet was sworn in on November 21. Two appointments made by 
Premier Brad Wall were very relevant to EPT reform. The appointment of Saskatchewan Party 
founding member Ken Krawetz to the post of Minister of Education and Deputy Premier was 
notable for three reasons. First, the dual post of Minister of Education and Deputy Premier sent 
the signal that education reform was a priority. Second, Krawetz‟s resume provided an assurance 
to school board stakeholders that education reform was being led by someone who could 
understand their position and understood the system (Wells interview, 2011). Krawetz was a 
former school trustee, former teacher, and a former president of the SSBA. The third reason 
Krawetz‟s appointment was significant and intriguing, was that he was an experienced provincial 
politician, having been first elected as a Liberal in 1995. He was a vocal critic of the EPT 
policies of the NDP when the issue gained prominence during the 1997 property reassessment 
(Krawetz, March 10, 1997).  
An appointee that contrasted with Krawetz‟s political and education background was 
rookie MLA Jim Reiter. Reiter was appointed Legislative Secretary to the Minister of Education 
with special responsibility for the “Property Tax Initiative” (Government of Saskatchewan, 
November 21, 2007). Reiter‟s background was in rural municipal government administration. He 
had served as Director and President of the Rural Municipal Administrators Association, and was 
Director on the Board of SARM from 1998 to 2003. Reiter‟s SARM background signalled that 
the government‟s approach to education funding and EPT reform would be sympathetic and 
favourable to rural interests. 
 The Saskatchewan Party‟s first Speech from the Throne was delivered December 10, 
approximately one month after the 2007 general election. An editorial in the StarPhoenix 
described the speech as an “abridged version of the Saskatchewan Party‟s campaign booklet”, 
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and therefore was predictably moving forward with its policy agenda (SP editorial, December 
11, 2007). Wall outlined the party‟s vision for education and EPT as follows: “My government 
understands that the future of our province depends on our education system. It realizes that the 
solution to the long-standing property tax issue can be found in funding education from general 
revenue” (Barnhart, December 10, 2007, p. 12). The government pledged to increase funding for 
education by 20% over four years. The government also stated that the Foundation Operating 
Grant (FOG) would be reviewed. Since the FOG defines the education funding system in 
Saskatchewan, reviewing the grant requires a review of related components like school board 
taxing authority and provincial transfers. The Property Tax Initiative that Reiter was tasked with 
completing would need to review these dimensions of education funding.  
The review had an inconspicuous launch in comparison with the attention that the 
Boughen Commission received from the media and advocacy groups. The government did not 
officially announce the review of the EPT system and the media did not provide any coverage 
regarding commencement of the review. The comparatively modest beginning of Reiter‟s review 
was much different than the comparatively substantial impact of the report‟s recommendations. 
6.4 Summary and Analysis 
 The Saskatchewan Party‟s rise corresponded with an increased urgency to implement 
major reforms to the EPT system. The Saskatchewan Party built a strong rural base of support in 
the 1999 and 2003 elections, and added enough urban support to win the 2007 election. The 
election platforms of the two parties differed on the high profile issue of EPT policy. An election 
announcement by the Saskatchewan Party to find a long-term solution to EPT sooner rather than 
later contrasted with the NDP‟s plan to simply continue expanding its EPT relief program for the 
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near future.  Their respective positions were rooted in a slightly different mix of political 
rationality and policy rationales. 
 Political rationality and policy rationales were tied to the competing visions for EPT 
reform that were brought forward by the policy platform of the NDP, as well as the policy 
platform and early initiatives of the Saskatchewan Party government. The policy platforms of the 
two parties indicated differing EPT reform policy objectives. The NDP did not stray from the 
policy objectives of balancing local autonomy with tax relief. The Saskatchewan Party‟s 
commitment to full provincial funding embraced the policy objectives of tax relief, education 
funding equity, and taxation equity. The two parties also had differing political rationality for the 
EPT reform plank of their platform. The Saskatchewan Party offered targeted tax relief in order 
to win support among voters who were urban homeowners and solidify support among voters 
who were agricultural ratepayers. The political rationality of the NDP on the other hand helped 
produce a strategy that sought to shore up its urban support by targeting homeowners and renters 
with tax relief. Political rationality was also evident in key appointments by the Saskatchewan 
Party‟s new government. Whereas the appointment of Ken Krawetz as Minister of Education and 
Deputy Minister signalled the priority of education funding, the appointment of rookie MLA Jim 
Reiter to oversee the Property Tax Initiative, which came to be known as the Education Property 
Tax Review, signalled that SARM and rural agricultural communities would be well represented 
during the reform. Together these appointments were intended in part to gain the support of 
municipal, agricultural, and education advocacy groups for EPT reform. 
The political rationality and policy rationales of the Saskatchewan Party government‟s 
Education Property Tax Review and related initiatives and political commentary will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7:  
THE EDUCATION PROPERTY TAX REVIEW AND REITER REPORT 
The Saskatchewan Party‟s commitment to produce a long-term solution to the EPT issue 
required a period of study and consultation. This started immediately following the provincial 
election in November 2007. At that time the provincial government established the Education 
Property Tax Review and designated a newly elected member of the caucus, Jim Reiter, to head 
it. Reiter was very familiar with the key issues and options related to the EPT because he had 
served as president of the Rural Municipal Administrators Association (RMAA) and also as a 
representative of the RMAA on SARM‟s board of directors. The review was launched without a 
formal announcement by the provincial government. Consequently, it did not receive any of the 
intense scrutiny from the media or advocacy groups that had ushered in the Boughen 
Commission. The informal and low profile of the launch of the review was followed by a low 
profile consultation and report writing process. The review was fifteen months in duration, 
starting with the Saskatchewan Party government‟s Throne Speech in 2007, and ending with the 
reform provisions announced in its provincial budget in 2009.  
This chapter starts by explaining the similarities and links between the NDP‟s EPT policy 
before the 2007 election and the Saskatchewan Party‟s policy initiatives before it announced the 
EPT reforms in 2009.  Next, it explains the positions and activities of advocacy groups during 
the consultations undertaken by the Reiter task force. The chapter concludes with an overview 
and analysis of the recommendations contained in that report. The focus of the chapter switches 
to political and policy considerations by examining Reiter‟s review and report. The rationale of 
Reiter‟s report will be revealed by examining the principles, process, and criteria used during the 
review. Next, the four policy options produced from Reiter‟s consultations will be summarized 
and their political viability will be examined. Advocacy group reactions to the report were absent 
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because the government kept the report under wraps until after the 2009 provincial budget was 
released. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the EPT policy formulation process of the 
provincial government and political rationales involved in determining which policy option 
would be adopted. 
7.1 The Saskatchewan Party’s Interim Policies 
The Saskatchewan Party‟s first opportunity to put its EPT election promises into action 
was the provincial budget of March 20, 2008. The new government honoured its commitment to 
increase property tax relief, while asking for more time to prepare a permanent reform policy. 
Money was injected into the EPT relief program that had been implemented by the NDP regime. 
Tax credit payments were boosted by $48.7 million, bringing the tax relief total to $157 million 
(Ministry of Education, 2009). The tax credit for agricultural properties was boosted by 9% for a 
47% tax credit. Other property classes experienced a more modest tax credit increase of 2% for a 
12% total. The NDP criticized the budget as being hypocritical for a party that had long been a 
critic of the NDP‟s education tax policies. New Democratic Party MLA Harry Van Mulligen 
argued that the Saskatchewan Party had failed to deliver the substantial reform that they had 
committed to during the election (Van Mulligen, March 18, 2008). Saskatchewan Party Finance 
Minister Rod Gantefoer defended the tax relief provision as a sound temporary policy while a 
permanent plan for reform was being considered (Gantefoer, March 18, 2008). Advocacy groups, 
acting jointly through the Education Property Tax Coalition, welcomed the increase in relief but 
continued to pressure the government for a long term solution (The Chamber, March 19, 2008; 
SSBA, March 18, 2008). SARM and APAS were satisfied with the EPT relief and promise of 
further action, and instead focussed their critiques on agricultural policy issues unrelated to the 
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EPT issue (Scott, March 20, 2008). SARM‟s response was remarkably subdued in comparison to 
the sharp rhetoric and actions that were the norm during the NDP‟s final term.  
A sign of the relationship being shaped by the Saskatchewan Party with school boards 
was the school closures legislation adopted in 2008. The new government standardized the 
school closure process for rural school divisions by amending the Education Act, 1995 
(Government of Saskatchewan, April 14, 2008). School closure review committees were 
introduced to encourage consultation with school community council members and local 
governments. Final decision making authority was retained by school boards despite the new 
oversight feature of a review committee, which limited the infringement on local autonomy. The 
rural orientation of this issue restricted the scope of advocacy group commentary to the SSBA 
and SARM. The SSBA had mixed reactions to the amendments. The organization was concerned 
that local autonomy was being undermined by standardization of the process, yet they were 
pleased that the ultimate decision to review schools, close schools, or discontinue grades was 
maintained (SSBA, April 15, 2008). SARM was disappointed with the school closure 
amendments. They argued that school divisions had lost any legitimate claim of local 
accountability during the amalgamation process, because the increased geographical size of 
school divisions made school boards unresponsive to local concerns (SARM, April 15, 2008). 
Based on this argument SARM sought an appeal mechanism that could be used by municipalities 
and other organizations for overturning school board decisions on a school closure (SARM, 
April 15, 2008). The clash of reasoning between the two organizations saw the SSBA defending 
local autonomy and SARM calling for increased local accountability through municipal 
government oversight. The Saskatchewan Party deviated from the NDP‟s previous policy of 
permitting school boards full control over school closure decisions. The Saskatchewan Party 
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achieved a balance with its toothless review committee policy increasing oversight by a small 
degree for municipalities, and the school closure standardization policy maintaining some school 
board autonomy. This balance nonetheless granted a degree of power to rural municipal 
governments and marginally diminished the authority of school boards because of the oversight 
feature granted to municipalities. 
7.2 Advocacy Group Positions during Policy Formulation 
The lobbying activities of advocacy groups ran parallel to the interim policymaking of the 
government and the consultation work conducted by Reiter. Patience was required while the 
government conducted its review, but advocacy groups nevertheless remained active in their 
EPT lobbying efforts. Business groups were particularly active during this period. In a policy 
brief, the provincial Chamber of Commerce described itself as a “prominent advocate for the 
overhaul and restructuring of the property tax system in Saskatchewan, especially as it pertains 
to the education portion of the tax” (Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, June, 2008). Shortly 
after the 2008 provincial budget was delivered, the Chamber called on the provincial government 
to remove all education taxes from property (Lyons, May 10, 2008). The Chamber‟s tax 
abolition stance is the most invasive policy option available on the issue.  
SUMA was also calling for the eventual abolition of EPT. The positions of these 
organizations was at odds with the joint position adopted by the Education Property Tax 
Coalition in 2008, which called for an education funding ratio of 75% provincial transfers to 
25% property tax by 2011 (SUMA, March, 2009). SUMA admitted in a policy brief that there 
was a tension between its Coalition position and its goal of EPT abolition: “Although the 
position of the Coalition involves a compromise from all parties, it will help SUMA 
incrementally work towards achieving its end goal of complete removal of the education portion 
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of property tax” (SUMA, March, 2009). SARM was subdued in its advocacy, a departure from 
the aggressive stance it had adopted during the NDP government‟s oversight of EPT policy. 
SARM president David Marit said his organization was patiently waiting for the Saskatchewan 
Party to fulfill its campaign promise of permanently reducing the education portion of property 
taxes (SP Editorial, November 14, 2008). SARM had shifted its lobbying priorities to other rural 
issues like road and bridge construction.  
The SSBA and resort owners made sure that their positions were heard as well. In early 
2008, SSBA Executive Director Bill Wells asked the Education Property Tax Review to adopt 
the 60-40 ratio of funding agreed to by the Education Property Tax Coalition (Brownlee, January 
12, 2008). Wells contended that predictable funding through the FOG was the best way to 
achieve the 60-40 ratio, and that local autonomy needed to be maintained through school board 
access to the property tax base. PARCS voiced its unique concerns. Resort communities were 
worried that the 2009 reassessment would punish resort owners due to the rapidly climbing value 
of resort properties. PARCS president Robert Taylor was calling for EPT relief with increased 
urgency (Hall, January 24, 2009). The positions of some of the advocacy groups directly clashed. 
The call by SUMA and the Chamber of Commerce for abolition of EPT was irreconcilable with 
the SSBA‟s position of preserving school board access to the property tax base. Other positions 
like PARCS‟ and SARM‟s demand for property tax reduction could be reconciled with the 
SSBA‟s position if an appropriate balance of funding sources was struck. 
7.3 The Features and Politics of the Education Property Tax Review 
 In a Regina Leader Post progress report on the Education Property Tax Review, Reiter 
explained that the EPT issue had been studied numerous times and that there was unlikely to be 
any “earthshaking revelations” emerging from his report (Brownlee, July 9, 2008, p. A7). The 
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purpose of the review was to set priorities, he said. Reiter consulted with the primary advocacy 
groups, most of whom were included in the Education Property Tax Coalition. The SSBA, 
SARM, SUMA, the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, PARCS, and the Association of 
Saskatchewan Realtors were consulted between June and November of 2008. Reiter also 
contacted government officials, and advocacy groups in the education and municipal sectors in 
Manitoba and Alberta in order to learn from their EPT policy experiences and evaluate their EPT 
policy options.  
The Saskatchewan Party government‟s priority setting agenda is contained in the major 
components of Reiter‟s report. The review contains insights into the principles, process, reform 
criteria, and policy options that set the parameters for reform. Seven principles guided the 
review. These principles included school board local autonomy, equity in education for students, 
horizontal tax equity, predictable and sustainable funding, fulfillment of government 
commitments for property tax relief, and provincial responsibility for K-12 education. Most of 
these principles are also found in the Local Government Finance Commission Final Report 
(1986), the School Finance and Governance Review Final Report (1991), and the Commission 
on Financing K-12 Education Final Report (2003). However, the last two principles included in 
the mandate of the Education Property Tax Review were unique. They provide insight into the 
Saskatchewan Party government‟s political rationality for commissioning the Review and for 
implementing some reforms. It wanted to demonstrate that, unlike the NDP governments that 
had preceded it, it would be fulfilling the commitments for substantial and sustained property tax 
relief and increase provincial financial responsibility for K-12 education. It calculated that these 
two reforms would consolidate and possibly expand its base of electoral support not only in rural 
but also in urban areas and fulfill its preferred mix of policy objectives. 
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The Education Property Tax Review utilized fifteen evaluative criteria to compare and 
assess the relative merits of the key features of selected policy options. The evaluative criteria 
are largely an extension of the principles of the review outlined above. They include incremental 
general revenue funding required, percentage relationship change, fiscal equity, sustainability, 
local autonomy, Ministry administrative costs, government commitments, 2009 mill rates, 
taxpayer equity, major beneficiaries, education equity, adequacy of funding, implementation 
timeline, statutory and regulatory changes required, and major risks (Reiter, 2009)
2
. The criteria 
were a mix of qualitative and quantitative measures designed to inform decision makers of the 
political, financial, and policy consequences of the four policy options. They helped formulate a 
list of predicted positive and negative outcomes, which will be discussed as it pertains to the 
adopted policy option at the end of this chapter. 
The Education Property Tax Review report contained four options for reforming the EPT 
policy. The first policy option was to continue the EPT credit program while increasing funding 
transfers. This option would be an expansion of the existing policy implemented by the NDP and 
maintained by the Saskatchewan Party in the provincial budget of 2008. The second option was 
increased general revenue funding of education. Ray Boughen recommended this approach in his 
commission‟s final report. One difference was that whereas Reiter‟s option did not discuss how 
the increase would be funded, the Boughen report recommended hiking the PST by 1% and 
assigning the revenue windfall to increased education funding.  The third option was adopting a 
uniform, provincially controlled EPT mill rate. This option would have the effect of removing 
taxing authority from school boards and introducing provincial oversight of the EPT system and 
uniformity in mill rates. The final option was the same as the third option, but added the 
possibility of flexibility if a local referendum produced consent for a discretionary levy by school 
                                                          
2
 The evaluative criteria are charted in conjunction with four policy options on pages 65 to 68 in the Reiter Report.  
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boards. The discretionary levy is a tool that is rendered worthless by its political unpopularity. 
This provision of voter approval for discretionary school board levies exists in British Columbia, 
and Alberta (Auld & Kitchen, 2006). School board use of the provision in these provinces varies 
from extremely rare to never. Policy option three and policy option four therefore offer the same 
outcomes. Three of the policy options shared the aim of achieving a 70-30 split between 
provincial and local revenues for education, with the exception of the EPT credit option which 
had the less ambitious funding ratio target of 55-45.  
Two of the three policy options were politically feasible and possibly even advantageous 
for the Saskatchewan Party government. The EPT credit program was a year-by-year, temporary 
solution started by the NDP and continued by the Saskatchewan Party in 2008. The 
Saskatchewan Party had pledged to produce a long term solution during the 2007 election. The 
EPT credit program was the status quo, and was not going to satisfy stakeholders. The two 
options that were politically feasible and potentially advantageous included enhancing provincial 
general revenue funding of education. Implementation of a uniform provincial property tax mill 
rate, which would inevitably also include increased general revenue funding. The provincial 
government decision to opt for a 70-30 funding ratio was a given. The key difference was the 
implications of each approach for local autonomy. The question that remained was whether the 
provincial government would take over EPT authority and effectively control education funding, 
or whether school divisions would maintain discretion over EPT mill rates while receiving 
increased provincial transfers. 
7.4 The Uncertain Transition from Consultation to Adoption 
The policy adoption process was confidential and cautious. The completed report was 
transferred confidentially to the Minister of Education, Ken Krawetz, at the end of January. The 
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exact date the report was submitted is unclear, as a date is not included in the report. The 
government announced that it was planning to keep the report under wraps until after the 
provincial budget was unveiled (Mandryk, January 22, 2009). All indications are that its decision 
to do so was based on uncertainty whether it had the resources to implement some of the more 
costly options in that report. Besides exercising considerable discretion during the decision 
making process, the government began dithering on its commitment to introduce a long term 
solution to EPT in the provincial budget due to fiscal restraints (Wood, February 4, 2009). An 
economic recession and declining provincial revenues resulting from a drop in oil prices, was 
thinning out the coffers as the government began crafting its annual budget in early 2009 (Wood, 
February 13, 2009). Every reform option listed in the report of the Education Property Task 
Review required increased provincial spending. Two weeks prior to the release of the provincial 
budget, the government sent mixed signals regarding the level of financial resources it could 
direct to the education sector to achieve the reform objectives that it had articulated. In an 
attempt to temper the expectations of various stakeholders, Premier Wall said that the reform 
plan contained in the spring budget might not contain all that was expected, and Minister 
Krawetz said that although some property tax relief would be in the budget, a new policy with 
more extensive and long-term relief would likely have to wait (Wood, March 3, 2009).  
An NDP MLA, Trent Wotherspoon, seized the opportunity to criticize and ridicule the 
Saskatchewan Party‟s emerging hesitation on major reform and its decision to keep Reiter‟s 
report confidential (Wotherspoon, March 3, 2009). The attitudes of participants at SUMA‟s 
annual convention reflected the impatience of advocacy groups who were concerned about the 
Saskatchewan Party‟s wavering commitment to reform (Hutton, February 5, 2009). The 
Saskatchewan Party‟s 16 months in power had thus far yielded short term tax relief, consultation, 
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and an ambiguous pledge to find a long term solution.  Uncertainty hung over the government‟s 
commitment to a long term solution as provincial budget day rapidly approached. 
7.5 From Review to Reform 
 The Education Property Tax Review report titled “A Decision for Our Future: Options 
for Long-term Educational Property Tax Relief” was eventually released after the tabling of the 
provincial budget. The government chose to adopt the third policy option contained in the report, 
which called for a provincially controlled EPT along with increased transfers from the provincial 
general revenue fund.  
 The provincial EPT funding option involved three components (Reiter, 2009). The main 
aim was to increase the portion of provincial general revenues directed to K-12 education to 
nearly 70% of the funding ratio. The strategy for achieving this aim was twofold. The 
government would implement a provincial EPT in order to gain control over mill rates. Second, 
the provincial government could then set EPT mill rates at a level that achieved EPT tax relief 
and funding ratio targets. The related measures identified by Reiter as necessary prerequisites for 
implementation included: Rebalancing tax incidence among property classes, the need for 
legislative amendments, factoring in the unique laws surrounding the separate school systems, 
and the requirement of enhanced ministry administration capacity to govern the new EPT 
responsibility (Reiter, 2009). At the heart of this policy option was clearly the                                                                                                                                         
centralization of education funding, which was a drastic departure from the status quo. 
 The analysis of anticipated positive and negative implications of adopting the provincial 
EPT funding option was included in Education Property Tax Review report.  An overview of that 
analysis provides valuable insights on the political rationality and policy rationales that 
underpinned the recommendations and ultimately the policy decisions of the provincial 
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government. The evaluative criteria outlined in the previous section of this thesis were the 
foundation for the analysis of positive and negative implications. The positive implications 
anticipated for transferring authority for setting the mill rate for the EPT from the school boards 
to the provincial government included achievement of funding equity, provincial control of tax 
incidence on the various property classes, and the ability to meet commitments for education 
property tax relief (Reiter, 2009). Another positive implication was the likelihood of increased 
taxation equity as taxpayers would be paying the same mill rate in all areas of the province. Once 
adopted, an improved funding formula could be expected to result in more precise calculations of 
the size of the property assessment base and the level of expenditures of school divisions. 
Negative implications could also be anticipated. School boards would lose their authority to set 
mill rates for EPT and by extension their fiscal autonomy in revenue generation. Despite the loss 
of autonomy for school boards, a levy would continue to be imposed on the property tax base to 
fund education. Two other implications would arise for the provincial government. It would 
become accountable for ensuring administrative effectiveness due to its increased control of 
education funding. It would also become responsible for the adequacy of education funding, 
which might involve increases in property taxes or increases in provincial general revenue fund 
transfers. 
7.6 Summary and Analysis 
 The Education Property Tax Review helped the new Saskatchewan Party government 
transition from the EPT policies of the NDP to the adoption of its own long term reform. 
Nevertheless, the period between the 2007 election and the 2009 provincial budget was marked 
by interim policies related to EPT, advocacy group positioning on the future of EPT, and the 
development of policy options by Reiter and his Education Property Tax Review team. The 
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interim policies extended the NDP‟s tax relief program for another year, and foreshadowed the 
Saskatchewan Party‟s willingness to impinge on local autonomy as it did on the issue of school 
closures. Advocacy groups remained active during the interim stage. The Education Property 
Tax Coalition developed a joint position of 75% provincial to 25% local funding, but SUMA and 
the Chamber of Commerce contradicted the unified position by calling for abolition of EPT. The 
Reiter report was instrumental in outlining information indicating the process, principles, and 
criteria that informed the review. These features shaped the policy options that were produced.  
The policy options that were being considered during this particular period included 
continued EPT relief, increased provincial general revenue funding, a provincial uniform EPT, 
and a provincial EPT with local flexibility. Uncertainty arose as the Education Property Tax 
Review was completed and the 2009 budget drew near. An economic recession, and the 
government‟s decision to withhold release of Reiter‟s report, brought speculation that the „long 
term reform‟ strategy would be delayed. The provincial government followed through on its plan 
in the end, choosing to adopt the option of a provincially-controlled EPT. The funding ratio for 
education would be brought to approximately 70% general revenue to 30% provincial property 
tax, which would be achieved through provincial control of mill rates and increased funding. 
Reiter‟s anticipated implications of the reform, framed in terms of policy objectives, included 
reduced local autonomy of school boards, increased taxation equity, improved equity in 
education funding, centralization of accountability, and complete provincial control over 
education funding levels.  
The Education Property Tax Review and report clearly define the political rationality and 
policy rationales for major EPT reform. The policy rationale included the new policy objective 
of provincial financial responsibility for K-12 education as well as the expected policy objective 
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of substantial tax relief, which were among a list of principles that were expected to guide the 
Review. The policy objective of balanced funding was defined for most policy options as a 70-30 
ratio of provincial to local sources, which in part reflects the political rationality of adopting a 
position that closely resembled the Education Property Tax Coalition‟s 2008 position of a 75-25 
funding ratio. Political rationality was also central to eliminating one of the four policy options 
from consideration. Continuing the EPT credit program would have been politically 
unacceptable based on the repeated Saskatchewan Party pledge of major reform. The positive 
and negative implications identified in this chapter, and as derived from the Reiter report, 
demonstrate a weighing of policy objectives which came out in favour of objectives like 
education equity, tax relief, and provincial accountability. In order to attain these favoured policy 
objectives, it was deemed reasonable by the provincial government to sacrifice local autonomy 
and take on the burden of administrative responsibility and funding adequacy of the reformed 
EPT system.  
In the next chapter, the details of EPT reform adoption and implementation will be 
discussed along with the impact of the reform on key stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER 8:  
ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND IMPACTS OF  
EDUCATION PROPERTY TAX REFORM 
 On March 18, 2009 the Saskatchewan Party fundamentally altered an education funding 
system that had been in place since the founding of the province of Saskatchewan. With the 
changes, school boards would no longer retain authority to levy a tax on property owners in 
order to fund a portion of education budgets. Tax relief was a key outcome of the reform. The 
government announced the financial details of its plan and needed to adopt the legislation that 
enabled implementation. These technical details will be summarized in this chapter. The 
legislative debates between the NDP and Saskatchewan Party provide insight into the alignment 
each party had with advocacy groups. The Saskatchewan Party produced favourable outcomes 
for ratepayers, while the NDP defended school boards.  
The Education Property Tax Coalition fragmented with the introduction of EPT reform. 
The reactions of the Coalition members varied widely, demonstrating the shaky foundation of the 
alliance. The force of the EPT reform had an impact on the key stakeholders. In the last section 
in this chapter, the important implications for school boards, the provincial government, 
municipal governments, and ratepayers due to EPT reform will be discussed. This chapter 
represents the culmination of key initiatives and reforms that preceded major reform by 
examining elements of the EPT reform initiative of 2009. 
8.1 Legislative and Budgetary Facets of Education Property Tax Reform 
The most significant component of the provincial budget of 2009 was the provision for 
EPT reform. Long term property tax relief was the message emphasized by the government. The 
provincial government dubbed the action, the “largest education property tax cut in history” 
(Government of Saskatchewan, March 18, 2009).  A commitment was made to reduce EPT by 
$103 million, resulting in a property tax reduction of 14% (Ministry of Education, 2010). The 
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EPT cut would be paired with an increase in provincial transfers for education of $241 million. 
The funding ratio would immediately shift from 51-49 provincial to property tax revenues, to 63-
37 provincial to property tax revenues. A commitment was made to further reduce EPT by $53 
million in 2010, altering the funding ratio to 66-34 provincial revenues to EPT (Government of 
Saskatchewan, March 18, 2009). The shift in authority produced by EPT reform meant that the 
long-time FOG education funding formula would need to be replaced. The government pledged 
to work with education stakeholders to develop a new funding system by 2011-12 (Ministry of 
Education, March 18, 2009). This would require a round of consultations with the SSBA.  
 The Saskatchewan Party government‟s policy required statutory amendments. The statute 
governing education funding, and most other features of the education system in Saskatchewan, 
is the Education Act, 1995. The EPT reform required repeal of clauses in the Education Act, 
1995, as well as introduction of new clauses to establish the new EPT authority of the provincial 
government. The legislative amendments that were implemented to enable EPT reform are a 
technical but critical stage in the reform process. The first major statutory vehicle for EPT reform 
was The Education Amendment Act, 2009 (No. 3), introduced as Bill 89 during the spring session 
of the 2009 legislature. The Act provided the necessary authority for the provincial government 
to set mill rates for EPT and for school boards to receive the EPT taxes from the municipal 
governments who would continue to collect them (Ministry of Education, March 18, 2009). The 
Act was passed on April 1
st
 and received royal assent on May 14
th
. It was melded into the 
Education Act, 1995 as Chapter 15. The provisions of Chapter 15 are woven into Part VI, 
entitled “Finance”, of the Education Act, 1995 under the sub-heading “Taxation” (Government 
of Saskatchewan 1995). Topics such as the setting of tax rates, collection of taxes by 
municipalities, and transfer of taxes to school divisions are contained in clauses 284 through 309. 
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 The second major legislative vehicle for EPT reform was The Miscellaneous Statutes 
(Education Property Tax) Repeal and Amendment Act, 2009, which was introduced as Bill 90 in 
the spring session of the 2009 legislature. The move towards provincial control of EPT made the 
EPT credit program redundant. The Miscellaneous Statutes (Education Property Tax) Repeal and 
Amendment Act, 2009 repealed The Education Property Tax Credit Act, as well as making 
amendments to municipal legislation to facilitate the adjustments being made in tax setting, tax 
collection, and tax redemption. The Education Property Tax Credit Act was the legislation 
introduced in 2005 that enabled the EPT credit program to provide relief to commercial, 
residential, and in a greater measure, agricultural ratepayers during the tax years 2005 through 
2008. The force of the new EPT legislation would be retroactive to January 1, 2009, providing 
seamless EPT policy. 
8.2 The Education Property Tax Reform in the Legislature 
 The motive for reform was based on specific policy rationales advocated by the 
Saskatchewan Party government. Three justifications introduced by the government since the 
2007 election campaign had been used to sell the EPT reform in the Legislature. The three policy 
rationales for EPT reform that Finance Minister Rod Gantefoer referenced during tabling of the 
2009 budget included: 1) a fair balance of revenue streams for education funding; 2) proper 
funding, or in other words an adequate level of funding, for K-12 education; and 3) significant 
reduction of education property taxes (Gantefoer, March 18, 2009). Proper funding speaks to the 
value of adequacy. The tax equity and education equity rationales discussed in Reiter‟s report 
could be accounted for in the pledges for a fair balance of funding and tax relief. Noticeably 
absent was discussion about the shift to provincial accountability, or the elimination of local 
autonomy. These loose threads were picked up by the NDP during the budget debate. 
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 In the spring of 2009, Premier Wall and former premier Calvert debated EPT reform in 
the Legislature. Calvert took the position that the Saskatchewan Party government lacked 
transparency in the process of reform by keeping school boards, and any other interested party, 
ignorant of the nature of the reform that would be adopted until legislation was tabled (Calvert, 
March 26, 2009). He expressed indirect support for school board autonomy when he said that the 
Saskatchewan Party “neutered the duly elected school trustees of Saskatchewan from their ability 
to tax” (Calvert, March 26, 2009, p. 2571). The focus of Calvert‟s argument was that the 
relationship between the provincial government and school boards had been undermined both by 
the process and the substance of the EPT reform. Wall responded that his loyalties lay with other 
stakeholders on the issue. Specifically, Wall argued that the best interests of pupils and property 
tax ratepayers were his priority (Wall, March 26, 2009). The argument that a centralized 
education funding system is in the best interests of pupils is debatable because of the impact of 
reform, but the benefit to property tax ratepayers is clear. In essence, the NDP was expressing 
support for school boards and the Saskatchewan Party was expressing support for property tax 
ratepayers. The school boards and ratepayers had their own positions on the EPT reform. 
8.3 The Advocacy Group Reactions to Education Property Tax Reform 
The magnitude of change produced by EPT reform provoked a swift response from key 
advocacy groups. Clear positions were articulated by SARM, SUMA, and the SSBA 
immediately after the policy change was announced. The Saskatchewan Teacher‟s Federation 
(STF), an organization that had been quite restrained in its public advocacy activities on this 
issue, also stepped into the forum to articulate a position on EPT reform. 
Municipal and business organizations approved of the reform, while SARM was outright 
enthusiastic about the change. SARM president David Marit dubbed it the “best budget for rural 
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Saskatchewan in history” (SARM, March 18, 2009). The enthusiasm was based on the 
agricultural class tax relief afforded by EPT reform. SARM was also pleased with the injection 
of funds achieved through the new Municipal Operating Grant system. SARM was sufficiently 
satisfied with the reform to declare that their longstanding criticism of an education tax on 
property had been “addressed” (SARM, 2009). The provincial government‟s intervention on 
EPT actually went further than SARM was demanding. The organization had been seeking 
property tax relief through its Education Property Tax Coalition position, but did not ask for a 
provincially controlled mill rate (D. Harvey interview, 2011). The uniform provincial mill rate 
provided certainty that EPT mill rates would only go up if the provincial government wanted 
them to. SUMA‟s response to the budget was similar to SARM‟s but less enthusiastic. Tax relief 
was welcomed, as the lower property tax rates were trumpeted by SUMA as crucial for attracting 
business investment and new residents to cities and towns (The Southwest Booster online, March 
19, 2009). Like SARM, SUMA was also excited about the new Municipal Operating Grant 
Program. The Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce sided with the municipal governments in 
welcoming EPT reform. Jamie McIntyre, President of the Chamber, regarded the reform as a 
“considerable step forward on a long ignored file”, which was “essential if we are to become 
property tax competitive with other jurisdictions in Canada” (The Chamber, March 19, 2009). 
Endorsement of EPT reform by the Chamber was quickly followed by criticism that more must 
be done to relieve property taxes for businesses in order to create a positive investment climate. 
School boards and teachers registered criticisms and some mixed feelings about the 
reform. The mild position on EPT funding matters by the Saskatchewan Teachers‟ Federation 
(STF) elevated a bit after EPT reform. The STF was “cautiously optimistic” about EPT reform 
when the provincial budget was released (STF, March 18, 2009). The main concerns of the STF 
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were that education funding remained adequate and equitable for all divisions. With the injection 
of $241 million in provincial transfers, along with a uniform mill rate, both of these objectives 
could be expected to be achieved for the 2009-10 budget year. The organization made a veiled 
criticism of the province‟s move to takeover mill rates, when it took the position of „watching to 
see that local decision making for school boards continued to be respected‟ (STF, March 18 , 
2009). This ambiguous statement ignored the reality that local autonomy of school boards was 
crippled by the reform. The SSBA took a similar stance on local autonomy that demonstrated its 
surprising willingness to surrender control of setting EPT mill rates without a fight. Education 
Minister Krawetz was diplomatic in his explanation of the government‟s decision to reform. He 
said it was a hard decision to implement EPT reform, because school boards wanted to retain 
autonomy to set mill rates (The Southwest Booster online, March 19, 2009). Krawetz‟s statement 
on the value of local autonomy to school boards was arguably stronger than the SSBA‟s own 
position. Roy Challis, President of the SSBA, offered a three-point response to the EPT reform 
(The Southwest Booster online, March 19, 2009). First, he acknowledged there was concern that 
local autonomy would be impacted. Second, he would be consulting with member school boards, 
the Minister of Education, and the SSBA executive before formulating a complete response. 
Third, the SSBA would hold the government accountable for the promise that the new funding 
method would preserve adequate and predictable funding. When compared to the aggressive 
tactics and rhetoric used by SARM to push for EPT tax relief after the 1997 reassessment, it is 
hard to ignore the submissive and tentative nature of the SSBA‟s comments during an 
unprecedented usurpation of its authority. 
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8.4 The Impact of Reform on Key Stakeholders 
 The EPT reform had an important impact on the major stakeholders of the initiative. The 
impact was felt in the relationship between the provincial government and school boards, with 
special circumstances for separate school boards, as well as notable impacts on municipal 
governments and ratepayers. 
8.4.1 The Provincial Government and School Boards 
EPT reform had profound impacts for the relationship between the provincial government 
and school boards. The impact was realized in two ways. First, the shifting of authority over mill 
rates changed the power relationship between school boards and the provincial government. The 
education funding partnership between school boards and the provincial government that was 
established in 1905 was fundamentally altered when school boards lost the authority to levy 
property tax and the provincial government became fully accountable for education funding. The 
provincial government became politically responsible for setting low, equitable tax rates, and 
providing adequate and equitable education funding to school boards. With the loss of taxing 
power, school boards would need to jockey amongst a variety of competing interests in order to 
lobby for and achieve adequate funding from the province (Challis, November 30, 2009). EPT 
reform was also anticipated to impact public support of school boards. It was expected that the 
loss of local autonomy for school divisions would result in a deterioration of public engagement 
with school board processes (SUMA, June, 2009). Another challenge for school boards was the 
uncertainty and inflexibility of the interim funding policy that was adopted while a new formula 
was being designed to replace the defunct FOG funding system. A new formula was expected to 
be adopted by the 2011 provincial budget, but this pledge was broken due to government delays. 
The funding policy remains in an interim stages two years after reform, with the new formula 
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expected in the 2012 provincial budget. Finding a new formula that meets the aims of adequacy, 
accountability, equity, and various other policy objectives has proven to be a difficult task. Issues 
of education funding adequacy have emerged since introduction of the interim policy. The 
interim funding policy was designed to cover teacher salary requirements and inflation, but 
otherwise froze school budgets at 2008-09 levels (Ministry of Education, March 18, 2009). 
Without control over their budgets, school boards were greatly hindered in their ability to secure 
funds for local needs, and they were also hindered in their ability to raise extra funds if they 
deemed provincial General Revenue Fund transfers or EPT allocations as inadequate. On a 
related issue, defenders of EPT reform argued that a uniform mill rate would correct perceived 
inequities that had developed under the FOG. During the spring of 2011, it emerged that funding 
equity may not have been achieved after EPT reform. Petitions were presented in the legislature 
which claimed that Regina separate schools were receiving $275 less per pupil than public 
schools (Morin, May 19, 2011). 
The challenges of  education funding equity and adequacy during the interim period have 
arisen due to the need for the provincial government to balance the fiscal realities of competing 
budgetary demands and fluctuating revenues with its aim of EPT cuts and adequate education 
funding. The second impact of EPT reform on the relationship between the provincial 
government and school boards was therefore fiscal. To fulfill the aims of its EPT reform 
program, the provincial government needed to inject large sums of General Revenue Fund 
monies during the 2009 provincial budget, in the 2010 provincial budget, and into the future to 
produce a long term solution for the education funding ratio and the lower EPT mill rates that 
lead to tax relief. With school boards now dependent on the provincial government to meet its 
funding requirements, tensions have risen whenever budget making has been undertaken. In 
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2010, the planned second phase of tax relief through lowered mill rates was stalled due to 
inaccurate potash revenue predictions. This setback also tightened school board budget 
allocations from the provincial government. The SSBA advocated a position that urged stability 
in education funding. President Sandi Urban-Hall said, “school boards don‟t want their funding 
levels to be at the whim of the rise and fall of commodities such as potash” (Hall, December 15, 
2009). The funding allocated to K-12 education in the 2010 provincial budget did not meet the 
SSBA‟s expenditure projections for the 2010-11 school board fiscal year. The funding shortfall 
would need to be made up through school board budget cuts, delayed maintenance projects, or 
by tapping reserve funds (Stewart, March 25, 2010). The 2011 provincial budget offered much of 
the same for education funding, as budget increases were confined to inflation.  
8.4.2 Separate School Boards 
The unique impact of EPT reform on the separate school system added a further 
dimension of complexity to the challenges between the provincial government and school 
boards.  Separate school divisions have been afforded constitutional protection of their taxing 
authority through section 93 of the Constitution Act (1867). This legal protection was 
circumvented by the provincial government during EPT reform implementation through 
manipulation of the provincial transfers to separate school boards. The provincial government 
made it clear that “the rates set by minority-faith boards of education must be in the same 
proportion by property class as government rates or their provincial grant allocation will be 
adjusted to ensure school division equity is maintained” (Government of Saskatchewan, 2009). 
The provincial government sought to ensure that separate school boards would not receive extra 
revenue if they raised mill rates above the uniform provincial rate. The province could enforce 
this policy by lowering provincial transfers by a proportionate amount to any increase in mill 
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rates. This meant that legally the Catholic school boards retained taxing authority, but effectively 
they no longer had control over their own revenues. All separate school boards opted in 2009 not 
to levy their own mill rates during their three year term (Government of Saskatchewan, 2011). 
The issue will be revisited after the next school board elections in October of 2012. Public school 
divisions do not enjoy constitutional protection, and therefore taxing authority could be legally 
and effectively revoked through the legislative amendments described earlier in this chapter. 
8.4.3 Municipal Governments 
Compared to the impact on school boards, the role of municipal governments in the new 
system was largely the same as before reform (Ministry of Education, March 18, 2009). Most 
importantly, municipal governments maintained the ability to levy a property tax. The 
municipalities would also continue to collect the education portion of property tax and remit it to 
the local school board. The main change was that the tax would now be collected on behalf of 
the provincial government‟s mill rate. The uniform mill rates meant that mill rate factors would 
no longer be applied to the EPT. The issue of vacated property tax room was not addressed 
directly, but indirectly. Tax room is the idea that tax cuts made by one taxing authority, like the 
provincial government did with lowered EPT mill rates, will proportionally open up room for 
another property taxing authority, in this case municipal governments, to raise their mill rates 
without affecting overall tax levels. Municipalities were given $266 million in financial 
assistance, or 90% of one percentage point of PST at the time of EPT reform (Government of 
Saskatchewan, March 18, 2009). An injection of this sum of cash to the municipal sector had the 
political effect of keeping municipal mill rates in check, so that these local governments would 
not invade the new property tax room created by EPT cuts. The promise to boost the new 
funding to 100% of one percentage point of PST further restricted the political ability of 
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municipalities to claim that they needed to raise property tax mill rates to meet funding 
requirements. 
8.4.4 Property Tax Ratepayers 
 The EPT reform was a major victory for property tax ratepayers. The ratepayers of every 
property class had two major concerns regarding EPT during the period preceding the 2009 
reform. First, they lobbied the provincial government for an adjustment to the education funding 
ratio. In 2005, the ratepayer representatives in the Education Property Tax Coalition joined the 
other members of the coalition in demanding that the provincial government produce a funding 
ratio of 60-40 provincial to local funds for education. For ratepayers, the aim of adjusting the 
funding ratio was desirable because it would lead to tax relief through lesser reliance on 
education property taxes to fund education. The funding ratio was a means to an end. That end 
was tax relief, which was the second; yet, main concern of ratepayers. The impact of EPT reform 
on tax rates and equity was immediate and clear. The agricultural class received the highest level 
of relief which helped address the equity issue. The Saskatchewan Party implemented a tax cut 
of 64.4% for the agricultural class, 8.34% for commercial property, and 27.8% for residential 
properties. The impact on the funding ratio was equally as clear. The funding ratio was 
immediately adjusted from 51-49 provincial to local funds, to a 63-37 ratio, with the aim of 
achieving a 66-34 ratio of provincial to local funds by 2010, which ended up being achieved in 
2011 instead. Ratepayers were the major beneficiaries of EPT reform, as is clear from the 
changes to tax rates and the funding ratio. The positive impact for ratepayers was immediate and 
enduring.  
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8.5 Summary and Analysis 
The Saskatchewan Party trumpeted the move towards a uniform provincial EPT as 
producing the largest EPT cut in history. The change also produced immediate shifts in the  
education funding ratio. The provincial portion of education funding compared to education tax 
portion was shifted from 51-49 to 63-37, with a 66-34 ratio promised by 2010, but achieved in 
2011. The changes to taxing authority and funding ratios gained statutory force with the adoption 
of The Education Amendment Act, 2009 (No. 3) and The Miscellaneous Statues (Education 
Property Tax) Repeal and Amendment Act, 2009. The NDP criticized the reform process as 
lacking transparency, and even more importantly, criticized the reform outcome as undermining 
school board autonomy. The Saskatchewan Party defended the changes as in the best interests of 
ratepayers. The substantial tax cuts for agricultural ratepayers, and notable tax cuts for other 
ratepayers, affirm the government‟s claim that ratepayers clearly benefitted. When the 2009 
reform was adopted, the Education Property Tax Coalition polarized and fractured. SARM, 
SUMA, and the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce welcomed the changes, with SARM the 
most enthusiastic and the Chamber the most reserved in its response. The SSBA was concerned 
about the loss of school board autonomy and the resulting vulnerability it would produce in 
achieving predictable and adequate funding. Similarly, the STF was concerned about the loss of 
school board autonomy, but was also optimistic that funding adequacy and equity were expected 
to be improved by the changes. The EPT reform had varying impacts on the main stakeholders. 
Municipal governments were enticed by the provincial government with a new funding deal in 
order to keep from filling the vacated tax room created by the EPT cuts. The role of municipal 
governments in administering the property tax system or levying mill rates was otherwise left 
unaltered. The impact on the relationship between the provincial government and school boards 
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was twofold. The power relationship between the two bodies was transformed through changes 
in taxing authority, and the fiscal demands of EPT reform strained government‟s coffers and the 
school boards‟ budgets. Further, the constitutional protection of taxing authority for separate 
school boards was circumvented by the provincial government through manipulation of transfers 
to bring funding levels in line with the public system. Ratepayers experienced the greatest 
benefit as a result of the EPT reform. The demand to shift the funding ratio was met, and 
substantial tax relief was provided to all ratepayers, with the greatest benefit being received by 
agricultural producers. 
In some cases, an explicit policy rationale was adopted by the provincial government for 
the 2009 EPT reform, but in other cases, political rationality and policy rationales were more 
implicit within the reform process and outcomes. The provincial government clearly stated its 
policy rationale was based on achieving the policy objectives of a new balance of funding for 
education, adequate funding of education, and significant tax reduction. Implicit in this rationale 
is that trade-offs amongst policy objectives were necessary including the usurpation of school 
board authority over mill rates and the need to bring in a temporary education funding policy 
until an permanent funding formula could be negotiated. Also implicit in the provincial 
government‟s policy rationale is that provincial accountability for education funding, and the 
increased fiscal demands placed on the provincial government to achieve its goals, were 
necessary trade-offs in order to achieve its explicit policy objectives. Political rationality was 
also implicit in the government‟s decision making. The decision to introduce provincial control 
of EPT mill rates was based on the aim of providing assurances to agricultural producers, and 
other ratepayers, that their tax relief would not be later undermined by school boards raising mill 
rates. Political rationality was also evident in the decision to avoid negotiating a new funding 
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formula while trying to implement tax relief. The negotiations would have brought scrutiny of 
reform policy options and consultation requirements for the whole reform package, which would 
have threatened the tax relief objective that was being prioritized. Political rationality was also a 
key factor in its decision to introducing Municipal Operating Grants at the same time as EPT 
reform. The boost in funding for municipalities created a political restriction, due to the 
expectations of ratepayers, on the ability of municipalities to invade the new tax room opened by 
EPT relief. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Purpose of Chapter 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the education property tax reforms 
undertaken by successive NDP and Saskatchewan Party provincial governments from 1997 to 
2011. The research question posed at the beginning of the thesis was: why did these provincial 
governments implement these reforms? This question has been addressed by using a rational 
choice approach that directed the analytical focus to the political rationality and policy rationales 
of the NDP and Saskatchewan Party governments. Political rationality hinged on the self-interest 
of provincial governments in gaining and maintaining electoral support amongst key advocacy 
groups by adopting the preferred combination of preferences of these groups. Policy rationales 
hinged on choosing reforms that maximized the achievement of the provincial government‟s 
preferred combination of policy objectives. In the consideration of both advocacy group 
preferences and policy objectives, the provincial government had to make some trade-offs. 
The remainder of this chapter consists of several sub-sections devoted in turn to 
providing a summary of the findings regarding the key features of the reforms implemented by 
each provincial government in Saskatchewan, the determinants that shaped the reforms, the 
political and policy implications of the reforms, and suggestions for further research. 
9.2 An Overview of the Reforms 
 The NDP and Saskatchewan Party governments each implemented reforms to education 
funding and the property tax system as it relates to education property tax. The three NDP 
governments implemented four significant reforms during a ten-year period. The first reform was 
the property tax reassessment of 1997 that updated property values for the first time since 1965. 
Total taxable assessment rose by 363.97%, with the biggest shift in tax burden for rural 
 87 
 
municipalities at 483.33%. The second reform was the Farmland Property Tax Rebate program 
for the 2000 and 2001 tax years, which provided $50 million in tax rebates for the agricultural 
property class. Thirdly, mandatory amalgamation of school divisions was adopted as a policy in 
2004 and completed by 2006, which resulted in school divisions being reduced from 81 to 28.  
The fourth reform implemented by the NDP was the EPT credit program that cut agricultural 
class EPT by 8% in 2005, and 38% in 2006 and 2007. The program also provided tax credits that 
cut EPT for all other ratepayers by 8% to 10% from 2005 to 2007 subject to a $2500 cap for the 
commercial and industrial property classes. 
 The Saskatchewan Party government that was elected in 2007 implemented three reforms 
during its first term in office. The EPT credit program established by the NDP was extended and 
boosted to a 47% tax cut for agricultural ratepayers and 12% for all other ratepayers. The second 
and third reforms were part of the major changes introduced to the education funding system in 
2009. The authority over setting EPT mill rates was shifted from school boards to the provincial 
government, and the FOG funding system was suspended in favour of a temporary funding 
arrangement that froze school board budgets at 2008-09 levels. These reforms allowed the 
provincial government to provide an immediate 14% EPT cut of 2008 EPT levels through 
lowered mill rates. The 2009 reforms also immediately shifted the education funding ratio to 63-
37 from 51-49 provincial transfers to local taxes. The adoption of a new education funding 
formula will represent a fourth reform by the Saskatchewan Party government. A new formula is 
expected to be unveiled in the 2012 provincial budget. 
9.3 The Determinants of Reforms 
Political rationality and policy rationales are integral components of the rational choice 
theoretical approach that is used in this thesis. Two key determinants, and a set of other 
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important determinants, explain why the NDP and Saskatchewan Party governments 
implemented the education funding and property tax reforms that have just been summarized. 
These determinants are derived from the political rationality and policy rationales of these 
governments. 
9.3.1 Political Rationality as a Determinant of Reforms 
The first determinant of the reforms examined in this thesis is political rationality. The 
key political determinant of these reforms was the high level of influence wielded by agricultural 
advocacy groups over the reform agenda of the provincial governments through various means. 
Advocacy groups like SARM, the Agricultural Producers of Saskatchewan, and the Tax Action 
Group utilized a variety of effective lobbying strategies such as tax revolts, petitions, rallies, 
coalition-building, policy papers, policy resolutions, and contact with high level decision makers, 
in order to put sustained and intense pressure on the provincial government to produce reforms. 
This high level of influence yielded the greatest benefit for the agricultural sector amongst all of 
the sectors involved in the EPT system. This benefit came in form of significant EPT relief. The 
political rationality of the two provincial governments was to try to manage this demand in the 
case of the NDP, or solidify the political support from this sector in the case of the Saskatchewan 
Party. 
The NDP at times stoked the fires of agricultural ratepayer discontent and at other times 
responded with reforms aimed to satisfy the influential agricultural advocacy groups. These 
reforms were deemed too slow, too weak, or too late by the agricultural sector in most cases. The 
reassessment had the effect of upsetting agricultural ratepayers due to the increased EPT burden 
that shifted to them. The NDP policies of an agricultural percentage of value and agricultural tax 
factor were designed to soften the blow of reassessment, but were deemed inadequate by SARM. 
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The Farm Land Property Tax Rebate was only a temporary fix, and the EPT credit program came 
too late to win rural support in the 2007 election. Despite the possibility of efficiencies and 
funding equity being produced due to mandatory school division amalgamation, this policy was 
also unpopular amongst agricultural producers as it corresponded with school closures that were 
concentrated in rural Saskatchewan. The NDP lacked the political will to reform the school 
boards‟ taxing authority after having expended the political capital required to achieve 
mandatory amalgamation. The chosen reform policy of an EPT credit program limited the 
government‟s ability to reduce EPT for agricultural ratepayers because school boards still had 
the ability to raise mill rates. The NDP also struggled to attain the financial resources necessary 
to provide the level of sustained or even increased tax relief being sought by the agricultural 
property class. The fiscal dimension is evident in the policy of linking EPT relief with a better 
federal equalization deal. The NDP did nevertheless make some progress on the tax relief and 
equity demands of SARM and other agricultural advocacy groups. 
The Saskatchewan Party was more closely aligned with the objectives of the agricultural 
advocacy groups as it had built its electoral support off a strong rural base. The party was 
therefore more inclined to adopt the preferences of the agricultural advocacy groups in order to 
solidify this base. The Saskatchewan Party alignment with the agricultural sector ensured that the 
critical stance of agricultural advocacy groups toward provincial policies and reforms would turn 
to support for the changes being promised by the new government. The extension and boost of 
the EPT credit plan in 2008 provided a satisfactory stop gap policy for agricultural advocacy 
groups, while the appointment of former SARM Board Director Jim Reiter signalled that 
agricultural interests would be well represented in the consultation and policy adoption stages of 
major reform. The agricultural property class was clearly the biggest winner from the major tax 
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cut and reform of mill rate authority introduced in 2009. By the time the second phase of tax 
relief was introduced in 2011, the agricultural property class taxes had been cut by 80% by the 
Saskatchewan Party government (Government of Saskatchewan, March 9, 2011). SARM 
announced that its long time grievance regarding EPT on agricultural land had been addressed. 
A second determinant that can be derived from a political rationality analysis is the role 
of advocacy groups from other key sectors in pressuring the provincial government to produce 
EPT reform. The major influence of the agricultural advocacy groups was strengthened by the 
notable influence exercised by advocacy groups from the municipal, education, and business 
sectors. The pressure applied by this broad coalition of interests was another determinant of the 
reforms. The formation of the Education Property Tax Coalition in 2005 was an important 
development in this regard. A consensus developed among a broad coalition of advocacy groups 
from the key sectors involved in EPT that a larger portion of education funding needed to come 
from provincial general revenues. The preferred combination of policy objectives among these 
advocacy groups were not always congruent despite adoption of a joint position on the issue of 
rebalancing funding between the two main sources of revenue. The SSBA sought education 
funding equity and adequacy, but also wanted to protect its autonomy in raising local funds. 
Municipal and business advocacy groups shared the policy objectives of the agricultural 
advocacy groups of tax relief and tax equity. The ability of these groups to work together on a 
common policy objective of increased provincial general revenue transfers for education helped 
agricultural ratepayers in particular, and to a lesser extent other ratepayers, inform the provincial 
government‟s political rationality that it should adopt the ratepayer-linked advocacy groups‟ 
preferred policy objective of tax relief in part through larger transfers for education funding. 
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Another notable determinant of reforms was the political rationality involved in 
managing tactical political considerations for the sake of winning and maintaining electoral 
support. In many instances, the provincial government was motivated to engage in particular 
initiatives or reforms in order to deflect criticism or gain political credit for positive results. The 
Boughen Commission initiative of the NDP deflated EPT reform as a controversial issue for the 
provincial government during a tight election campaign, which enabled the party to avoid 
negative criticism of its political record. The Saskatchewan Party demonstrated a similar political 
rationality in its handling of the Education Property Tax Review. The discreet nature of the 
Review process helped the Saskatchewan Party government avoid media and advocacy group 
scrutiny and interference in its reform plans. Similarly, it can be posited that the Saskatchewan 
Party delayed negotiation of a new funding formula in order to ensure that the possibility of a 
negative response to a new formula would not interfere with the priorities of gaining provincial 
control over EPT in order to achieve tax relief and tax equity. Political considerations were also 
at the forefront of the NDP‟s decision to link EPT relief with federal equalization payments, 
which enabled the party to deflect criticism of its perceived slow response to EPT relief 
demands. The Saskatchewan Party also strategically shifted political responsibility to another 
level of government when it decided to increase municipal transfers at the same time as its EPT 
cuts. The strategy was to shift political responsibility over any property tax increases onto 
municipal governments should they decide to fill in the tax room created by EPT reform, as the 
increased transfers would signal to voters that municipal governments should not have to raise 
property taxes to meet their revenue requirements. 
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9.3.2 Policy Rationales as a Determinant of Reforms 
The second determinant of the reforms examined in this thesis is policy rationales. A key 
policy rationale of both provincial governments was that selection of the policy objectives of a 
reform involved trade-offs. In particular, it was necessary to sacrifice the policy objective of 
school board local autonomy in favour of strengthening other policy objectives that were being 
sought through reforms. Collectively, the package of reforms introduced by the NDP government 
between 1997 and 2007 had the effect a small loss of school board local autonomy and a small 
gain in achieving other policy objectives. By contrast, the Saskatchewan Party government‟s 
reforms had the effect of a large loss of school board local autonomy and a large gain in 
achieving other policy objectives. Both of these governments sought to achieve the policy 
objective of changing the balance of funding sources for education towards lesser reliance on 
EPT. The nature of this balance helps explain the trade-offs required to achieve reform. 
A key determinant of reforms was a policy rationale held by the NDP and Saskatchewan 
Party governments. Both governments adopted the policy rationale that it was necessary to make 
policy objective trade-offs. The reforms were somewhat similar in outcome for both the NDP 
and Saskatchewan Party governments but differed in degree due to this policy rationale. For the 
NDP government, mandatory amalgamation represented a trade-off of the education funding 
policy objectives of local autonomy and funding equity, with the former being weakened and the 
latter being strengthened by the increased size of school divisions. The 1997 reassessment, the 
Farm Land Property Tax Rebate program, and the EPT credit program prioritized the policy 
objectives of tax equity and tax relief. These reforms had little impact on school board local 
autonomy because of the use of tax credits to achieve tax relief. The 2009 EPT reform package 
implemented by the Saskatchewan Party government represented a more profound trade-off 
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between local autonomy and other policy objectives. Tax relief and tax equity were prioritized, 
while funding equity and adequacy arguably had the potential to improve depending on the new 
funding formula that will be created for education. Local autonomy was significantly 
undermined because of the strategy of using provincial control of mill rates to achieve tax relief 
and tax equity, as well as arguably achieving other policy objectives like funding equity and 
adequacy. 
Integral to the policy rationale of accepting trade-offs was the policy objective of finding 
a new balance of funding streams for education that favoured heavier reliance on provincial 
transfers. The balance of funding streams between local and provincial sources was determined 
by choosing a balance of policy objectives. Increased provincial general revenue transfers would 
lead to achievement of the policy objectives of tax relief, tax equity, and education funding 
equity because reliance on the EPT to fund education is decreased and local variance in property 
tax assessment base has less impact on equity objectives. On the other hand, the use of some 
EPT to fund education helped achieve other policy objectives up until major reform was 
introduced in 2009. Before the 2009 reform, access to the EPT allowed school boards to exercise 
local autonomy by raising the revenues that they saw fit for responding to local needs. After the 
reform of 2009, EPT served the more basic function of limiting the fiscal burden of education 
funding for the provincial government by providing a stream of revenue for school division 
budgets other than general revenue transfers. Simply put, before major reform occurred in 2009 
the policy objective of local autonomy was tied to school board access to some EPT, while the 
achievement of policy objectives like tax equity, tax relief, and funding equity was tied to 
provincial transfers for education. The degree of change to the balance of funding demanded a 
corresponding degree of policy objective trade-offs. The EPT credit program implemented by the 
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NDP had helped shift the funding ratio to 50-50 by the time the Saskatchewan Party extended the 
program in 2008. This reform involved no major trade-off, but achieved only a small gain in 
changing the balance of funding. The Saskatchewan Party produced a more significant change in 
the balance of funding of 66-34, and did so by making a more profound trade-off in policy 
objectives.  
The findings of this thesis regarding the determinants that shaped the policy decisions of 
successive governments are consonant with the fundamental assumptions of the rational choice 
approach regarding political rationality and policy rationales.  Regarding political rationality, the 
reform decisions of provincial governments were heavily influenced by the preferences of the 
most powerful advocacy groups. Similarly, regarding policy rationales, the governments were 
implementing policies based on an assessment of the relative merits of a series of policy 
objectives. Moreover, confronted with a multiplicity of policy objectives that were not entirely 
reconcilable, the provincial governments were constrained to make trade-offs among policy 
objectives.  
9.4 The Political and Policy Implications of Reforms 
 All reforms have had important political and policy implications for the current and 
future state of EPT and education funding policies. The political and policy implications of the 
reforms are discussed in turn below. This includes the political implications for provincial 
relations with the key sectors involved in this policy area, and the implications for policy 
objectives relating to the education funding system and property tax system.  
9.4.1 Political Implications for Provincial Government Relations with Key Sectors 
 The political rationality of the provincial government has shaped the political 
implications of reforms. In order to sustain the political support that has been gained by the 
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reforms, particularly those introduced in 2009, the Saskatchewan Party government will need to 
take certain actions and resist other actions that pertain to the agricultural, municipal, business, 
and education sectors. The provincial government must keep EPT mill rates at the current 
lowered level in order to maintain its high level of political support from the agricultural sector, 
and moderate level of support from the business and municipal sectors. The provincial 
government also needs to continue providing financial incentives like the new Municipal 
Operating Grant program in order to maintain political support from the municipal sector while 
achieving the policy objective of keeping municipal governments from invading the tax room 
opened up by lowered EPT mill rates. Regarding the education sector, the provincial government 
must continue to meet the demands of increased General Revenue Fund transfers required by the 
new education funding policy in order to maintain or build its political support amongst the 
education sector, while negotiating a new funding formula that provides adequate and equitable 
education funding for school boards in the future. 
9.4.2 Policy Implications for the Education Funding and Property Tax Systems 
 The policy rationales that the provincial governments adopted in implementing their 
respective reforms have implications not only for its current policies but also for future policies. 
These implications pertain to the policy objectives of the education funding dimension of this 
issue (e.g., balanced funding, funding equity, funding adequacy), and the property tax dimension 
of this issue (e.g., tax equity, tax relief). 
 Three significant implications for the provincial education funding policy objectives 
emerge due to the policy rationales adopted by the provincial government. First, the policy 
objectives achieved by EPT reforms are short term, due to the lack of a new funding formula. 
The new balance between local and provincial sources, the current perception of funding 
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adequacy, and the current perception of funding equity will all be replaced with new standards 
when the new funding formula is implemented. Second, if the new funding formula does not 
meet the policy objectives of funding adequacy and funding equity, then these policy objectives 
of the education sector will join local autonomy as being undermined by the tax equity and tax 
relief objectives of the 2009 reforms. Finally, the local autonomy of school boards is vulnerable 
to being further diminished if the provincial government decides to adopt a more conditional 
approach to funding transfers. 
 The implications for the property tax system policy objectives of tax equity and tax relief 
should also be considered. The tax equity and tax relief achieved by the agricultural sector is 
only sustainable as long as provincial EPT mill rates remain at current levels and rural municipal 
governments do not invade the tax room opened by lower EPT mill rates. Tax relief for property 
classes such as the residential property class and commercial property class, though this tax relief 
is smaller in scale, is subject to the same considerations as the agricultural sector but relate more 
to the relationship between the provincial government and urban municipalities. 
9.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
The scope of this thesis was narrowed to some specific features of the EPT reform issue 
primarily from 1997 to 2011. The focus was on the provincial government‟s choice of policy 
objectives that comprise a policy rationale, and the political rationality involved in adopting 
advocacy group preferences. More research must be done in this area. The creation of a new 
funding formula will need to be researched in order to develop a more complete picture of the 
Saskatchewan Party‟s reform legacy. The formula is expected to be introduced in 2012. An 
education policy approach focussing on finances and budget numbers would be useful to provide 
a quantitative dimension to research in this area. The quantitative research could focus on 
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assessing the budget cuts, tax hikes, or new revenues that are found in order to meet the final 
financial requirements of the 2009 EPT reform. A more normative approach to the issue based 
on administrative values or policy objectives such as quality of education would be useful in 
informing policymakers of the best way to move forward in the funding of education and 
provincial access to the property tax base. 
Comparative research is also needed. This should include comparative research on the 
policies and politics of financing major Government of Saskatchewan portfolios like education, 
health, and municipal government, which could develop a more complete understanding of 
provincial fiscal decision making and how it effects relations with local governing bodies and 
boards. Inter-jurisdictional comparative work should also be considered. The policies and 
politics of education funding among Canadian provinces could be researched, and comparative 
work could also be done at the international level. 
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